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ACTIVIST DISTRESSED DEBTHOLDERS:  
THE NEW BARBARIANS AT THE GATE? 
MICHELLE M. HARNER

 
ABSTRACT 
The term “corporate raiders” previously struck fear in the hearts of 
corporate boards and management teams. It generally refers to investors 
who target undervalued, cash-flush or mismanaged companies and initiate 
a hostile takeover of the company. Corporate raiders earned their name in 
part because of their focus on value extraction, which could entail 
dismantling a company and selling off its crown jewels. Today, the term 
often conjures up images of Michael Milken, Henry Kravis, or the movie 
character Gordon Gekko, but the alleged threat posed to companies by 
corporate raiders is less prevalent—at least with respect to the traditional 
use of equity to facilitate a hostile takeover. 
The growing use of debt rather than equity to cause a change of 
control at target companies raises new concerns for corporate boards and 
management teams and new policy considerations for commentators and 
legislators. Are activist debtholders who employ this investment strategy 
akin to the corporate raiders of the past? This Article explores these issues 
by, among other things, presenting in-depth case studies and critically 
evaluating the value implications of traditional takeover activity and 
regulation. It compares and contrasts the use of equity and debt in control 
contests and identifies similarities that suggest some regulation of 
strategic debt acquisitions is warranted. The Article proposes a proactive 
approach that better equips corporate boards and management teams to 
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negotiate with activist debtholders while preserving investment 
opportunities for debtholders and the governance efficiencies that often 
flow from activism for the corporate target‟s other stakeholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The theme of Barbarians at the Gate is greed and the 
dehumanizing effect of the acquisitions mania. No concern is shown 
for the people who will be hurt by the takeover, for tradition, for 
preserving a company that has meant so many things to so many 
people. Making more money is the fix that gets the junk bond 
junkies through their day.
1
 
Barbarians at the Gate referred to the activities of equity investors who 
earned the name ―corporate raiders‖ in the 1980s.2 This term also reflects a 
common characterization of activist distressed-debt investors—investors 
who use a company‘s debt (rather than equity) to facilitate a change of 
control at the company.
3
 Activist distressed-debt investors typically extend 
credit to, or purchase the debt of, financially troubled companies and then 
exploit the leverage associated with the underlying debt instruments to 
acquire ownership of the company through a debt-for-equity exchange or 
credit bid in a sale of the company‘s assets. 
 
 
 1. Michael Schrader, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco, NATION‘S 
RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 2, 1990, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3190/is_n14_ 
v24/ai_8903527. 
 2. See generally ROBERT SLATER, THE TITANS OF TAKEOVER (1999) (exploring transactions 
pursued by, among others, T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn, and Ted Turner in 1980s); Don Chew & 
Michael Jensen, U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s (Oct. 9, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at ssrn.com/abstract=146150 (discussing takeover activity in the 1980s and 
resulting corporate governance implications). See also Roy C. Smith, Worth Every Last Million, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2007, at B1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/01/19/AR2007011901363.html (explaining activities of corporate raiders and their 
influence over management compensation trends, as well as noting that corporate raiders would 
―cruis[e] the market for likely takeover targets and offer[] hostile bids, at premium prices, on well-
known but poorly performing companies‖). For historical background on the investment practices of 
corporate raiders, see generally DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WHITE SHARKS OF WALL STREET: 
THOMAS MELLON EVANS AND THE ORIGINAL CORPORATE RAIDERS (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., The Vultures Take Wing, THE ECONOMIST, May 29, 2007, http://www.economist. 
com/node/8929289 (―Distressed-debt traders, who buy bonds no one else will touch, and turnaround 
specialists, who pull companies back from the brink, operate in a topsy-turvy world, where bad times 
are good and corporate wreckage yields rich rewards.‖); Richard Bravo & Elizabeth Hester, KKR 
Turns Vulture Investor as Distressed Debt Beckons, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5WF1xFH1Awk (explaining the ―loan 
to own‖ strategy of distressed debtholders); Michael Maiello, Third Avenue‟s Distressed Debt Play, 
FORBES.COM (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0316/048_distressed_debt_play. 
html (explaining similar investment strategy employed by Third Avenue Funds). For a general 
discussion of distressed debt investing, see MARTIN J. WHITMAN & FERNANDO FIZ, DISTRESS 
INVESTING (2009); see also Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy 
Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (2008) (describing 
activities of distressed-debt investors). 
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Whether accomplished using debt or equity, takeover activity might 
impose discipline and much-needed monitoring.
4
 On the other hand, such 
activity can also be disruptive and produce significant profits for the new 
owner at the expense of the other stakeholders, leaving the impression the 
investor raided the corporate coffers.
5
 That impression is particularly acute 
in the distressed debt context, where shareholders and junior creditors 
generally are wiped out and any value created by the investment strategy 
flows primarily to the activist investor and perhaps the restructured 
company to a limited extent. 
This Article examines the takeover activity of distressed debtholders 
against the backdrop of traditional corporate raiders and their use of equity 
to acquire corporate control. Traditional corporate raiders target 
undervalued, cash-flushed or mismanaged corporations. They seek to 
unlock value that is underutilized or overlooked by existing management. 
Several studies suggest that hostile takeovers increase corporate value, 
which generally flows to existing shareholders through a stock price 
premium.
6
 That value may also benefit the corporation and other corporate 
 
 
 4. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (discussing debate concerning value of corporate takeovers in context 
of board veto rights and arguing that such rights are unnecessary); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the 
Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer‟s Role in Corporate 
Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984) (noting that many commentators view takeovers as 
promoting efficiency); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target‟s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (discussing corporate 
governance efficiencies promoted by takeover activity); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: 
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992) (discussing various studies and 
theories suggesting that takeover activity increases firm value). 
 5. See Charles V. Bagli, A New Breed of Wolf at the Corporate Door: It‟s the Era of the 
Civilized Hostile Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at D1 (―The hostile deals of the 1980‘s were 
made by people viewed as bust-up artists and speculators looking for short-term profit. . . .‖ (quoting 
Robert Kindler)); Harold M. Williams, It‟s Time for a Takeover Moratorium, CNNMONEY.COM (July 
22, 1985), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1985/07/22/66154/index.htm 
(citing takeover activity as contributing to management ineffectiveness and working against 
productivity); see also Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The 
Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 555, 556 (1985) (noting that criticism of 
corporate raiders typically involves allegations that they ―‗prey upon and defraud stockholders,‘‖ 
―‗take[] over and loot[]‘‖ their corporate targets, and pay themselves ―‗excessive‘ compensation and 
perquisites,‖ but not finding empirical support for the ―raider‖ image). But see David Carey & Sara 
Hammes, Can Raiders Run What They Raid, CNNMONEY.COM (June 4, 1990), http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1990/06/04/73625/index.htm (―[R]are is the raider who can 
manage the company he has acquired any better than the chief executive whom he vilifies and 
ousts. . . .‖). 
 6. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 4 (discussing studies regarding value impact of takeovers); see 
also Robert P. Bartlett, III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt-Financing Distorts Bidding 
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975 (2008). Bartlett emphasizes the need to 
consider bidders‘ financing choices in empirical studies concerning the value implications of 
takeovers. Furthermore, he notes that ―the ability of bidders‘ financing decisions to affect bidder 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/4
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constituents (including creditors) to the extent that the acquirer continues 
the business and improves management or operations.
7
 The changes 
imposed by the acquirer, however, may oust existing management, add 
leverage, strip core assets or otherwise impede long-term value. The latter 
possibilities lend to the sometimes questionable reputations of traditional 
corporate raiders. 
To address these undesirable possibilities, Congress and state 
legislatures enacted a variety of takeover-related legislation, starting with 
the Williams Act in 1968.
8
 The Williams Act requires that entities make 
certain disclosures when intending to pursue a tender offer, or upon 
acquiring five percent or more of a public company‘s stock.9 The Williams 
Act does not necessarily endorse or condemn hostile takeovers. Rather, its 
purpose is to provide information to parties involved in the potential 
transaction to foster better-informed decisions.
10
 In contrast, most states 
enacted ―anti-takeover‖ legislation—measures generally designed to create 
more protection for management and more obstacles for potential 
acquirers in the takeover process.
11
 
Commentators debate the pros and cons of anti-takeover legislation. 
Proponents of takeovers point to the governance benefits generated by an 
active market for corporate control.
12
 The actual or even potential threat of 
 
 
valuations reveals the inherent difficulty of using a bidder‘s offer price as a proxy for its ability to put 
a target‘s assets to productive use.‖ Id. at 2024. 
 7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part II. 
 8. The Williams Act mandates, among other things, disclosures by certain shareholders 
concerning the amount and purpose of their holdings. It amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
See Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, 454–55 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006)); see also Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1985) (explaining the origins of the Williams Act and the major elements of the 
legislation); discussion infra Part II. 
 9. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 8, at 1889 (summarizing key elements of Williams 
Act). 
 10. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND 
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 193 (10th ed. 2007) (―This 5% threshold establishes an 
early warning system that gives both the target and other potential bidders time to prepare; thus its 
practical effect is to promote auctions and increase the takeover premium that a bidder must offer to 
secure control.‖). 
 11. For a thorough discussion of state anti-takeover legislation, see Michael Barzuza, The State 
of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1974 (2009); see also infra Part II. 
 12. See ROBERT E. HOSKISSON ET AL., COMPETING FOR ADVANTAGE 317 (2008) (examining the 
role of takeovers in corporate governance); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002); see also 
supra note 4 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in 
Corporate Takeovers, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002); James P. Walsh & Rita D. Kosnik, Corporate 
Raiders and Their Disciplinary Role in the Market for Corporate Control, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 671, 
691 (1993) (―[W]e found little evidence to support the claim that corporate raiders can accurately 
identify and eliminate ineffective boards of directors and entrenched management teams.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a hostile takeover can discipline corporate managers and improve 
accountability. For these reasons, many institutional shareholders have 
pressed corporate boards to remove defensive measures, such as 
shareholder rights plans from companies‘ governance documents.13 
Despite increased regulation, equity-based takeover activity continues. 
Recent hostile or uninvited takeover activity includes Air Products & 
Chemicals‘ bid for Airgas, Sanofi-Aventis‘ bid for Genzyme Corp., and 
Carl Icahn‘s bid for Lions Gate Entertainment.14 That activity, however, 
often is less contentious than in the past and may take different forms. 
Among other things, potential acquirers may work with or seek allies 
among the target‘s shareholders, and ―takeover targets are borrowing 
tactics from the 1980s, but avoiding such a scorched-earth approach.‖15  
In addition, an investor who seeks control of a company may forego an 
equity investment and instead acquire a significant position in the 
company‘s debt. A debt investment is not subject to the disclosure 
requirements of the Williams Act.
16
 Likewise, it does not trigger anti-
 
 
 13. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998); see also Martin Lipton & Paul 
K. Rowe, Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002) 
(noting that ―the decision of most institutional investors that they would not vote for charter 
amendments designed to deter or regulate hostile takeovers‖); Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon 
Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2001) (arguing for more shareholder self-help in the debate regarding anti-
takeover protections). 
 14. See, e.g., Jef Feeley, Genzyme Sued by Investors Over Sanofi Buyout Bid, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 
12, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-12/genzyme-sued-by-investors-over-
rebuff-of-sanofi-aventis-takeover-attempt.html; Brett Pulley, Lions Gate Board Rejects Icahn‟s Hostile 
Takeover Bid, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 23, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-
23/lions-gate-board-rejects-icahn-s-hostile-takeover-bid-update1-.html; Airgas to Appeal Ruling on 
Takeover Fight, REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1110408 
120101011.  
 15. Steven M. Davidoff, A New Kind of Defense Against Hostile Bids, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Sept. 29, 2010, 10:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/a-new-kind-of-defense-against-
hostile-bids/ (―Companies are adapting strategies for a market where corporate governance is 
increasingly important, activist and institutional shareholders wield significant power and proxy 
advisory services like Institutional Shareholder Services can sway up to 20 to 40 percent of the vote 
through their recommendations.‖); see also Amanda Cantrell, Do‟s and Don‟ts for Corporate Raiders, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 8, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/07/markets/hedge_activists/index. 
htm (positing that successful corporate raiders work hard to get ―big, normally passive institutional 
investors on board‖). Private equity firms and hedge funds also have emerged on the scene as a 
frequent initiator of hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Joseph A. McCarthy & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Private 
Equity and Hedge Fund Activism: Explaining the Differences in Regulatory Responses, 9 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 535 (2008); Emily Thornton & Susan Zegel, The New Raiders, BUS. WK. (Feb. 28, 
2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_09/b3922041_mz011.htm (explaining that 
hedge funds are part of the new breed of corporate raiders that are more aggressive and less reliant on 
third-party financing than corporate raiders of the 1980s). 
 16. The disclosure requirements imposed by the Williams Act apply only to persons who 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/4
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takeover defensive measures facilitated by state law. In fact, relatively 
little regulation governs the activities of investors acquiring debt in the 
secondary loan and bond markets.
17
 
This lack of regulation provides a significant advantage to an investor 
making a control play. Among other things, it reinstitutes the element of 
surprise once prevalent and advantageous to acquirers in the hostile 
takeover process.
18
 Investors generally have no obligation to disclose 
when they purchase a company‘s debt. Consequently, management often 
does not know who holds the company‘s debt until an investor is already 
positioned to make its move. Moreover, the investor faces little downside 
risk because, if the takeover attempt fails, the investor is still likely to 
receive some return (perhaps even a significant profit) when the company 
repays the debt. 
A debt-based takeover is not feasible, however, in every situation. This 
strategy works primarily in the distressed company context. Specifically, 
the investor attempts to identify and purchase the distressed company‘s 
―fulcrum security‖—i.e., the tranche of debt in the company‘s capital 
structure that effectively captures the company‘s enterprise value.19 The 
fulcrum security is similar to equity in that its holders arguably are the 
residual owners of the company. The distressed debtholder then uses the 
company‘s debt restructuring efforts as a takeover opportunity.20 
 
 
―directly or indirectly [acquire] the beneficial ownership of any equity security. . . .‖ 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(d)(1) (2006). Although debt may constitute a security under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, it is not included within the scope of section 13(d) of the Act. 
 17. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1662 
(2008) (discussing lack of pre-bankruptcy regulation over private parties seeking to influence a 
company‘s restructuring); Harner, supra note 3. 
 18. See, e.g., JEANNETTE GORZALA, THE ART OF HOSTILE TAKEOVER DEFENCE 12 (2010) 
(explaining that disclosure regulations ―were put in place to limit the element of surprise‖ in hostile 
takeovers); The Future of Tender Offer Regulation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 6, 2008, 12:40 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/the-future-of-tender-offer-regulation/ (―At the time [of the 
enactment of the Williams Act], the corporate bogeyman du jour was the ‗Saturday Night Special,‘ in 
which a bidder would embark on a pre-offer buying raid to establish a substantial beachhead of 
ownership at a reduced price‖). 
 19. See, e.g., Christie Smythe, “Fulcrum” Deals Rising to Prominence, Experts Say, 
LAW360.COM (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/122360/-fulcrum-deals-rising-
to-prominence-experts-say (―As companies mired in debt continue to seek refuge in bankruptcy court, 
popularity is growing in so-called fulcrum investing, a risky bet placed on debt securities bought on 
the cheap and expected to be converted into equity holdings through the restructuring process . . . .‖); 
David W. Marston, Distressed Debt: Forget the Vultures, Your Lenders May be Circling, GIBBONS 
P.C. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.gibbonslaw.com/news_publications/articles.php?action=display_ 
publication&publication_id=2879 (―The fulcrum security is the security most likely to be converted 
into equity in a reorganized company.‖). 
 20. See, e.g., Katalin E. Kutasi, Distressed Investing—Market Trends and Outlook, HEDGE FUND 
MONTHLY (July 2007), http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/07_july_Kellner_Dileo_Distressed_ 
Investing_Markets_Trends_and_Outlook.asp (―Managers [of distressed debt funds] can be control 
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Debtholders invoke this control strategy in both out-of-court workouts 
and in-court reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
21
 
Recent examples include CIT Group, Lear Corp., Reader‘s Digest, and 
Trump Entertainment.
22
 Notably, some investors pursue both traditional 
takeover strategies and debt-based takeovers.
23
 
Similar to traditional takeovers, the value of debt-based takeovers is 
subject to debate.
24
 For example, on the one hand, distressed debtholders 
may represent a source of liquidity for distressed companies that otherwise 
may be unavailable. These investors frequently offer debtor-in-possession 
financing or post-reorganization capital infusions that allow the company 
 
 
oriented—taking more of a private equity approach—and investing in debt securities they believe will 
be the fulcrum security to control the equity (the loan to own model).‖); Steven R. Strom, Hedge Fund 
Power Plays in the Distressed Arena, J. CORP. RENEWAL (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.turnaround. 
org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=5436 (―The most basic tactic is to acquire large portions of 
fulcrum security debt in anticipation of converting into post-reorganization equity.‖). 
 21. Surveys of distressed-debt investors indicate that the use of the fulcrum security to acquire 
control of the debtor company is a core investment strategy. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Trends in 
Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors‟ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
69, 82 (2008) (stating that ―of those responding, 32 firms (52.5%) indicated that their primary 
investment practice is to pursue an exchange of the debt for equity.‖). Marston reports that ―[o]ver 
60% of the hedge funds and institutional investors surveyed by Debtwire said that distressed-debt is 
part of their ‗core investment strategy.‘‖ Marston, supra note 19. Marston furthermore notes that 
―robust returns are not the real play with distressed debt, the more lucrative jackpot is turning debt into 
ownership of the company.‖ Id. For a discussion of factors that influence the decision to pursue an out-
of-court versus in-court workout, see Edith S. Hotchkiss et al., Bankruptcy and the Resolution of 
Financial Distress, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 25 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 
2008) (―Transactions prices, however, are significantly lower than those paid for nonbankrupt firms 
matched on size and industry.‖). 
 22. See, e.g., Bravo & Hester, supra note 3 (explaining KKR‘s debt-for-equity exchanges in Lear 
Corp. and Reader‘s Digest); Steven Church & Beth Jinks, Trump Beats Carl Icahn in Takeover Battle 
for His Namesake Casino Company, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 13, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2010-04-12/trump-beats-carl-icahn-in-takeover-battle-for-his-namesake-casino-company.html 
(explaining Trump‘s alliance with Avenue Capital Group, which proposed a plan to convert the 
casino‘s bond debt into equity); Mike Spector & Kate Haywood, Icahn Could Become Top 
Shareholder at CIT Group, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at B3 (explaining the conversion of Icahn‘s 
bond debt into equity). 
 23. For example, Carl Icahn uses both equity and debt to try to influence governance matters or 
acquire control of a company. In fact, in his bid for Lions Gate, Icahn first tried to purchase the 
company‘s bond debt and only subsequently tried an equity tender offer and takeover. See, e.g., 
Claudia Eller, Lions Gate Makes Deal to Keep Bonds Out of Carl Icahn‟s Hands, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/21/business/fi-ct-lionsgate21 (explaining Icahn‘s attempts to 
buy Lions Gate‘s bond debt); Evan Hessel, Icahn in the Lionsgate Den, FORBES.COM (Mar. 27, 2009, 
12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/26/carl-icahn-lionsgate-business-media-icahn.html 
(explaining Icahn‘s control efforts with respect to his equity holdings and that ―Icahn has also targeted 
Lionsgate‘s debt as a mechanism for exerting influence‖); Josh Kosman & Claire Atkinson, Billionaire 
Eyes Merger of MGM, Lionsgate Studios, N.Y. POST, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/ 
business/icahn_carl_icahn_2zVPQvZG6S8BJWtc0vGJaN (noting that Icahn is Lions Gate‘s largest 
shareholder and owns about 13 percent of MGM‘s debt); see also supra note 14 and accompanying 
text. 
 24. See infra Parts I.B, III.B. 
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to continue operations. On the other hand, the debtholder‘s investment 
may facilitate a restructuring that undervalues the company to the direct 
detriment of junior creditors and shareholders. Accordingly, the challenge 
is to preserve the liquidity, discipline, and accountability attributes of 
debt-based takeovers and to protect the company and its stakeholders 
against potential raids. 
This Article presents the first extensive analysis of debt-based 
takeovers and their impact on corporate reorganization value. Part I of the 
Article summarizes the potential issues raised by debt-based takeovers. 
This summary provides critical context for the remainder of the Article by 
highlighting similarities among takeover strategies and the potential 
abuses permitted by regulatory gaps. Part II continues to lay the Article‘s 
foundation by reviewing the historical development of traditional takeover 
strategies and takeover-related regulation. It also describes the increasing 
use of debt to facilitate a change of control at distressed companies. 
Part III then explores several debt-based takeovers and takeover 
opportunities in the newspaper industry. Specifically, this Part discusses 
the debt-based takeovers of American Media, Inc.; Freedom 
Communications, Inc.; the Star Tribune; Tribune Co.; and Philadelphia 
Newspapers. Those examples facilitate an in-depth analysis of debt-based 
takeovers and their role in the market for corporate control. The discussion 
identifies and examines factors such as information asymmetry, bargaining 
inequality, and lack of financial alternatives that contribute to potential 
raids in the debt-based takeover context. 
Part IV offers a regulatory response to help level the playing field in 
the distressed market for corporate control. This proposal draws on the 
original approach of the Williams Act; it does not seek to encourage or 
discourage debt-based takeovers, but rather aims to provide pertinent 
information to the markets to foster more value-generating activity.
25
 The 
element of surprise that once provided significant leverage to corporate 
raiders continues in the context of debt-based takeovers and hinders 
meaningful auctions and control contests that might otherwise enhance 
value. The Article concludes by urging more disclosure and opportunity 
for signaling and market participation in debt-based takeovers. 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 8, at 1897 (―Thus, ‗investor protection‘ properly 
understood in its narrow 1968 meaning, is a congressional policy, but only about disclosure to 
shareholders by the principal antagonists in the takeover battle.‖). 
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I. THE EMERGING ROLE OF DEBT-BASED TAKEOVERS 
Traditionally, debt represented an extension of credit to a company 
governed by negotiated contract terms.
26
 The lender expected, and indeed 
wanted, nothing more than repayment of the debt at maturity.
27
 The lender 
made its profits based on the negotiated interest rate and fee structure. 
Likewise, the company‘s primary concern upon a potential default under 
the debt instruments was the cost of obtaining a waiver or forbearance 
from the lender.
28
 
Although some lending relationships follow a traditional structure, 
many more have evolved into complex capital investments where the 
parties‘ expectations and objectives are very different.29 A company‘s 
credit facilities and bond issuances may offer an ownership opportunity 
for investors, particularly investors in troubled companies.
30
 Anecdotal 
and empirical evidence suggest that certain investors target the debt of 
distressed companies specifically for this purpose.
31
 This Part explains the 
contours of these investment strategies—commonly referred to as ―loan-
to-own‖ investments—and the issues they pose for managers, 
stakeholders, and overall corporate value. 
 
 
 26. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 
669–71 (2010) (explaining traditional lending relationship); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board 
Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 
133–35 (2009) (explaining the traditional relationship between a lender and borrower and changes in 
the dynamics of that relationship); Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the 
Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 641, 641–50 (2009) (same).  
 27. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 26; John Mueller, The Business Dynamics of 
Bankruptcy, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1997, at 28, 28 (―A company that is contemplating 
bankruptcy has long since violated the bank‘s lending standards, and hence the lender‘s overwhelming 
objective is to get its money back and terminate the relationship.‖). 
 28. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Henry, Understanding Crisis Management and Business Workouts, 14 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1995, at 28, 28 (explaining objectives and motivations of debtor and other 
parties in negotiations concerning a debtor‘s default or potential default under loan documents); 
Mueller, supra note 27 (same). 
 29. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 26; Whitehead, supra note 26; see also Jamie 
Mason, Reluctant Proprietors, DEAL MAG. (Oct. 15, 2010, 12:29 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/ 
magazine/ID/036946/features/reluctant-proprietors.php (explaining and contrasting traditional 
preferences of banks with those of hedge funds and private equity firms). 
 30. See, e.g., Harner, supra note 3 (explaining debtholder investment strategies); Lipson, supra 
note 17 (exploring nontraditional lending activities in distressed scenarios). 
 31. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in 
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009); Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor 
Control in Financially-Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005 (1994); Harner, 
supra note 21 (presenting findings of survey of distressed-debt investors); M. Todd Henderson, Paying 
CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1543 (2007). 
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A. Examples of Loan-to-Own Investments 
Purchasing the debt of a troubled company to earn an enhanced return 
is not a new investment strategy.
32
 Distressed-debt investors, also 
commonly called ―vulture investors‖ or ―grave dancers,‖ have long 
employed this strategy.
33
 The strategy is receiving greater attention, 
however, as debtholders use loan-to-own investment techniques to 
generate returns not through the payoff of the debt, but rather through 
converting the debt into ownership of the company itself. Investors 
employ these techniques in both the in- and out-of-court restructuring 
contexts in the United States and abroad.
34
 
 
 
 32. For example, in their seminal work THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means discuss creditor activism and creditors‘ potential influence over 
corporate boards. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 78–84 (1932) (using the Fox Films and Fox Theatre Corporation as an example of 
creditor influence). See also Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims & Taking 
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1990) (explaining early 
examples of creditor control strategies under the Bankruptcy Code). Distressed debt deals reportedly 
were valued at $84.4 billion in 2009, and similar valuations are expected in 2010 and 2011. See 
Distressed-Debt Deals in 2009 Reach $84.4 Billion, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57A0SD20090811; Firms‟ Distressed Debt Cycle Not Over, 
Pimco Says, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 27, 2010, 2:47 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/ 
05/27/distressed-debt-cycle-not-over-for-firms-pimco/; Investors Bullish for 2010, Finds Fifth Annual 
North American Distressed Debt Market Outlook Survey, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 26, 2010, available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/investors-bullish-for-2010-finds-fifth-annual-north-
american-distressed-debt-market-outlook-survey-82682842.html. 
 33. See, e.g., The Vultures Take Wing, supra note 3 (explaining the ―vulture tag‖ given to 
distressed-debt investors); Daniel Fisher & Matthew Craft, Junk Time, FORBES.COM (Sept. 29, 2008, 
6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0929/090.html (―Vulture funds . . . buy large stakes in 
companies they expect to fail, with plans to gain control during bankruptcy. The so-called loan-to-own 
strategy usually pays off after a company emerges from Chapter 11. Lots of vultures still hover on the 
sidelines.‖); Miles Weiss, Zell Returns to Grave Dancing with $625 Million Distressed Fund, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 1, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=aiM0qVKDpGP8 (explaining that investor Sam Zell ―dubbed himself the ‗Grave Dancer‘ for 
turning profit on troubled assets‖). 
 34. Loan-to-own strategies often are used in prepackaged or traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
cases. Past examples include Trans World Airlines, Kmart and Macy‘s. See Joe Bel Bruno, Is There a 
Raider Lurking? Past Bankruptcies Have Opened Door to Takeovers, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 16, 
2005, at A20 (discussing Trans World Airlines and Kmart); Michael Marray, Macy Cool to Takeover 
Move by Federated, INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Jan. 4, 1994), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
business/macy-cool-to-takeover-move-by-federated-deal-would-create-huge-store-chain-1404700.html 
(discussing Macy‘s). Debt-based takeovers in the bankruptcy context are discussed throughout this 
Article, including infra Parts I.A, III and IV. For an example of an out-of-court loan-to-own strategy in 
the United States, see Jonathan Marino, The Next Breed of Hostility? American Greetings‟ Loan-to-
Own Play for Its Private Rival Could Be the Next Big Thing in Hostile Takeovers, INVESTMENT 
DEALERS‘ DIGEST, Nov. 10, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 21466443 (explaining how American 
Greetings Corp.‘s purchase of $44 million of the debt of its competitor, Recycled Paper Greetings, 
surprised both observers and Recycled Paper Greetings and sparked litigation). For discussion of loan-
to-own strategies in European markets, see Donal O‘Donovan & Emmet Oliver, York Buys Quinn 
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For example, in the United States, KKR & Co. invested in the debt of 
Lear Corp., an automotive industry supplier, and ultimately agreed to 
exchange its debt for a significant ownership interest in the reorganized 
company.
35
 The Lear Chapter 11 case that facilitated the debt-for-equity 
exchange was relatively quick and painless, with Lear emerging from 
bankruptcy in just four months.
36
 Lear‘s stock also performed strongly 
post-emergence.
37
 The Chapter 11 cases of Reader‘s Digest and CIT 
evidence similar investment strategies by creditors, with similar relatively 
positive results.
38
 
This type of debt-for-equity play is not a traditional investment strategy 
for private equity firms like KKR, but ―they are [increasingly] making 
loans to the neediest borrowers and muscling in on turf traditionally 
dominated by so-called vulture investors.‖39 New players in the distressed 
debt space have intensified turf wars, and conflicts among private equity 
firms, hedge funds, and other creditors appear to be on the rise. In 
 
 
Debt in Suspected Loan-to-Own Bid, INDEPENDENT.IE (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/ 
business/irish/york-buys-quinn-debt-in-suspected-loantoown-bid-2339287.html (―The Irish Independent 
has learned that York Capital has been buying up Quinn Group debt that is being sold at prices more 
than 40pc below face value.‖); Helia Ebrahimi, New Debt-for-Equity Deals Put Lenders in Charge as 
Companies Struggle to Meet Repayments, TELEGRAPH (June 7, 2009, 11:42 PM), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/5470223/New-debt-for-equity-deals-put-
lenders-in-charge-as-companies-struggle-to-meet-repayments.html (explaining creditor takeover 
strategies in Europe); Tom Freke, Lenders Mount Loan-to-Own Bid for Monier, REUTERS, June 9, 
2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINTRE55833420090609 (―Lenders to French roofing 
company Monier Group have launched a takeover bid to oust current private equity owner PAI 
Partners . . . .‖); Anousha Sakoui & Martin Arnold, Vulture Funds Circle as Debt Fears Bite, FT.COM 
(Feb. 17, 2009, 11:34 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/982b9f0e-fd2a-11dd-a103-000077b07658. 
html#axzz1DJwTIqI3 (explaining activity of U.S. distressed-debt investors in European markets).  
 35. See, e.g., Bravo & Hester, supra note 3 (―KKR & Co. . . . is part of a group converting loans 
made to Lear Corp. into a controlling stake in the bankrupt car-seat maker.‖). In addition to using 
unsecured or undersecured bond or bank debt, distressed debt investors also can pursue loan-to-own 
strategies with senior secured debt, which often serves or can serve as debtor in possession financing 
for the target company—i.e., it becomes the company‘s restructuring lifeline. That type of financing 
potentially gives the investor additional leverage over the company. See, e.g., David Peress & Thomas 
C. Prinzhorn, Nontraditional Lenders and the Impact of Loan-to-Own Strategies on the Restructuring 
Process, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48, 57–58. 
 36. See Press Release, Lear Corp., Lear Receives Approval of First Day Motions (July 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.lear.com/InTheNews/1066/1/Lear-Receives-Approval-of-First-Day-Motions. 
aspx; Press Release, Lear Corp., Lear Completes Financial Reorganization and New Common Shares 
Will Begin Trading on the NYSE (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.lear.com/InTheNews/1064/ 
1/Lear-Completes-Financial-Reorganization-and-New-Common-Share.aspx.  
 37. See More Companies Go Public Soon After Bankruptcy, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2010, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60B4V320100112 (noting that Lear‘s post-bankruptcy 
stock price increased by 26 percent). 
 38. Id.; see also Bravo & Hester, supra note 3 (discussing Reader‘s Digest); Spector & 
Haywood, supra note 22 (discussing CIT). 
 39. See Bravo & Hester, supra note 3. 
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addition, a debtor‘s management may not be aware of potential conflicts 
within the debtor‘s capital structure, and they consequently may align with 
the interests of one stakeholder group prematurely or be unprepared for, 
and become paralyzed by, the resulting conflict.
40
 
Conflict among distressed-debt investors over control of the 
reorganized debtor prolongs the company‘s Chapter 11 case, distracts 
management from the debtor‘s core business operations, and increases 
overall restructuring costs.
41
 For example, several investors holding pre-
petition debt or offering new investments participated in an $8 billion 
debtor-in-possession financing facility for Lyondell Chemical with the 
expectation that at least part of their debt holdings would be converted into 
equity of the reorganized company.
42
 After the Chapter 11 petition was 
filed, however, junior creditors contested the claims of certain lenders, and 
the bankruptcy court appointed an examiner to investigate the allegations 
of prepetition misconduct raised by those claims.
43
 The junior creditors 
also filed a lawsuit asserting fraudulent conveyance claims against some 
of the senior lenders and certain other parties relating to a pre-petition 
leveraged buyout.
44
 Ultimately, after approximately fifteen months in 
bankruptcy, Lyondell emerged with the senior creditor group receiving a 
majority ownership position, but at a greater cost to the company.
45
 
 
 
 40. See discussion infra Part III.  
 41. See generally Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Creditors‟ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749 
(2011). 
 42. See, e.g., Shasha Dai, KKR Getting on DIP Financing Bandwagon Too, WSJ.COM (July 7, 
2009, 7:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/07/07/kkr-getting-on-dip-financing-band 
wagon-too/ (―KKR has provided DIP financing to several companies in recent times, according to a 
person familiar with the situation. Other deals include ones for Lyondell Chemical Co., Smurfit-Stone 
Container Corp., Calpine Corp., Delphi Corp., Delta Airlines Inc., Quebecor World Inc. and UAL 
Corp.‖); Bravo & Hester, supra note 3 (suggesting that Apollo Management was part of a syndicate 
providing Lyondell debtor-in-possession financing facility); see also Vipal Monga & John Blakeley, 
Rigors of Rehab, DEAL MAG. (Apr. 17, 2009, 1:29 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/ 
features/rigors-of-rehab.php (explaining the details of Lyondell‘s debtor-in-possession financing 
facility). 
 43. See, e.g., Judge Approves Examiner for Lyondell, REUTERS, Nov. 2, 2009, available at http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0244196820091102.  
 44. See Emily Chasan, Judge: Lenders Can Intervene in Lyondell Lawsuit, REUTERS, Aug. 18, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1842417420090818 (explaining fraudulent 
conveyance lawsuit filed by the committee of unsecured creditors and the interests of certain senior 
lenders holding the fulcrum security, including KKR and Ares Management); New Storm Clouds Over 
Tribune Co. Bankruptcy Case, TRADINGMARKETS.COM (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.trading 
markets.com/news/stock-alert/trb_new-storm-clouds-over-tribune-co-bankruptcy-case-1192752.html 
(explaining the allegedly antagonist role of Aurelius Capital Management as a junior creditor in the 
Lyondell Chemical Chapter 11 cases and suggesting that Aurelius used aggressive tactics to hold up 
settlement and plan of reorganization). 
 45. See, e.g., Lindsey Bewley, LyondellBasell‟s Exit Strategy, CHEM. WEEK, May 10, 2010, at 33 
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Similar patterns emerged in the Chapter 11 cases of Adelphia 
Communications, Inc. and Tribune Co., among others.
46
 
Control contests arise in Chapter 11 cases because who gets to own the 
reorganized company often turns on how the company is valued and who, 
under those valuations, holds the fulcrum security.
47
 A distressed-debt 
investor may buy a senior tranche of debt expecting the value of the 
company to be insufficient to pay that debt in full, which would give the 
investor a potential opportunity to convert its debt holdings to equity. If 
that investor‘s valuations are inaccurate or if the company‘s valuation 
changes before the restructuring is completed, a junior class of creditors 
may actually hold the fulcrum security and be entitled to the company‘s 
equity.
48
 In that case, senior creditors may be cashed out or may be forced 
to continue to extend their pre-petition debt to the company under pre-
petition terms—a concept known as reinstatement under the Bankruptcy 
Code. This scenario became a reality for senior creditors in the Chapter 11 
case of Charter Communications.
49
 
In addition to debt-for-equity exchanges, a distressed investor may 
accumulate debt and then credit bid the value of that debt in a sale of the 
company or its assets.
50
 Carl Icahn has used this investment strategy with 
 
 
(explaining that Apollo Management owns approximately 25 percent of reorganized company and 
Ares Management owns approximately 7 percent of reorganized company); Ana Campoy & Marie 
Beaudette, Lyondell‟s U.S. Arm in Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at B2, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123127968554958711.html (reporting filing of Chapter 11 case); 
Tiffany Kary & Linda Sandler, Lyondell Says Its Plan Is Superior to Reliance Bid, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 
8, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLgTaDw.2AgA 
(explaining terms of proposed plan of reorganization); Tiffany Kary, Lyondell‟s Reorganization Plan 
Approved, Will Exit Bankruptcy by April 30, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 24, 2010, available at http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-23/lyondell-s-chapter-11-reorganization-plan-approved-by-bankruptcy-
judge.html.  
 46. See, e.g., Randall Chase, Noteholders Not Backing Down in Opposing Trib Plan, 
ABCNEWS.COM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12325965 (explaining 
conflict in Tribune Co. Chapter 11 case). 
 47. See discussion of fulcrum security supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Mason, supra note 29 (explaining role of valuation in determining fulcrum security); see 
also Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 67, 95–96 (2010) (explaining use of fulcrum security in debt-based takeovers). 
 49. Apollo Management LP began purchasing Charter Communication‘s debt in 2008 and led the 
group of noteholders (holding $1.6 billion of debt) that sought and obtained ownership of Charter 
Communications through its Chapter 11 case. See Chris Nolter, Distress Calls, DEAL MAG. (Jan. 22, 
2010, 11:57 AM), http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/2010/jan-25-2010/distress-calls.php. Charter 
Communication‘s plan of reorganization proposed leaving approximately $11.8 billion of bank debt in 
place after confirmation of the plan without the bank‘s consent. Id. Apollo reportedly received ―a 31% 
economic stake and 20% of the voting stock‖ under the plan of reorganization. Id. 
 50. See STUART C. GILSON & EDWARD I. ALTMAN, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURING 29–30 (2010) (explaining use of credit bidding to facilitate loan-to-own investment 
strategy). Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sell its assets free and clear of all 
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several companies, including Tropicana Casino & Resort and 
Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings LLC.
51
 A key concern with credit 
bidding is that it chills any competitive bidding process for the company, 
thereby giving the creditor or stakeholder group a supposedly unfair 
advantage to the detriment of junior creditors. Accordingly, a debtor‘s 
management and other creditors often oppose tactical credit bidding, as in 
the Chapter 11 case of Philadelphia Newspapers.
52
 
B. Potential Issues with Loan-to-Own Investments 
As described above, the objective of debtholders in a loan-to-own 
scenario is ownership of the company either through a credit bid in an 
asset sale or a debt-to-equity exchange. For public companies, the latter 
typically requires a Chapter 11 filing under the Bankruptcy Code to 
extinguish the interests of public shareholders.
53
 For both private and 
public companies, Chapter 11 also may prove useful for facilitating a sale 
free and clear of other claims, liens, and encumbrances asserted against the 
company and its assets.
54
 Accordingly, bankruptcy frequently plays an 
important role in the loan-to-own strategy. 
At first glance, a debtholders‘ willingness to invest in a troubled 
company—whether in or outside of bankruptcy—appears admirable and 
desirable from a policy perspective.
55
 The capital infusion represented by 
 
 
claims, liens and encumbrances upon notice, hearing and bankruptcy court approval. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363(b) (2006); see also id. § 363(f) (authorizing sales ―free and clear of any interest in such 
property‖ if one of five conditions is met). Section 363(k) in turn permits secured creditors to bid using 
the amount of their secured claims under certain circumstances in a sale of the debtor‘s assets under 
section 363(b). Id. § 363(k). 
 51. See John Blakeley, Bust and Buy, DEAL MAG. (Jan. 22, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www. 
thedeal.com/newsweekly/features/special-reports/bust-and-buy.php (discussing Tropicana and 
Fontainebleau acquisitions); see also Jamie Mason, Cheap Trick, DEAL MAG. (Sept. 18, 2009, 1:57 
PM), http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/030200/features/hard-times-1/cheap-trick.php (explaining 
the role of credit bidding in loan-to-own strategy and listing examples of strategy in action, including 
―Elliott Management Corp. and Silver Point Capital LP‘s $3.4 billion credit bid for Delphi Corp‖). 
 52. See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that secured 
creditors did not have an absolute right to credit bid in a sale conducted in connection with a debtor‘s 
plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 53. See Mason, supra note 29 (explaining the difference in private versus public company debt-
for-equity exchanges).  
 54. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 55. See, e.g., Martin Eisenberg, When Hedge Funds Invest in Distressed Debt, 238 N.Y. L.J. 11 
(2007) (―A balanced assessment of the impact of distressed investing in bankruptcy proceedings 
demonstrates that distressed investors are beneficial to the reorganization process contributing, among 
other things, substantial resources in the form of capital, financial acumen and expertise.‖); see also 
discussion supra note 4 (discussing corporate governance and other positive attributes of takeover 
activity, which can apply in the distressed context). 
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the ―loan‖ part of the equation may provide the company with much-
needed liquidity to keep the doors open, employees at work, and 
customers satisfied.
56
 Moreover, the company‘s management may have 
limited alternatives and view the proposed investment as the best option 
under the circumstances.
57
 In most instances, management negotiating 
with its back against the wall is rarely productive. 
Consequently, the devil often is in the details of the loan commitment 
or the terms of the debtholders‘ investment.58 For example, the debt 
instrument may impose overly stringent covenants, provide the lenders 
with control or veto rights, or otherwise set up the company for eventual 
failure.
59
 Alternatively, the investor may purchase the debt after the fact at 
an extremely deep discount and have different valuation objectives than 
holders who bought the debt at face value or have junior claims against the 
company.
60
 A debtholders‘ ownership agenda can create challenging 
issues for the company and its other stakeholders. 
These issues are similar to those presented to the management of a 
solvent company that is a takeover target. Accordingly, the remainder of 
this Article considers the similarities and differences in equity-based and 
debt-based takeovers. Specifically, it discusses the different regulatory 
approaches to each takeover strategy and evaluates greater regulation in 
the debt context. As regulation of equity-based takeovers suggests, this 
requires a delicate balancing act.  
 
 
 56. See, e.g., GILSON & ALTMAN, supra note 50, at 55 (―[D]istressed investors can be a valuable 
source of new money and new ideas to troubled companies in need of both.‖ (citing $8 billion debtor-
in-possession financing facility for Lyondell Chemical, funded in part by distressed-debt investors)). 
 57. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053 (2008) (discussing 
challenges faced by management of distressed companies); Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality 
and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 
107–10 (1998) (same); see also Matthew M. McDonald & Jennifer J. Kolton, Transactions with 
Distressed Companies: Key Questions for Directors, ENTREPRENEUR.COM (Summer 2009), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/206357289.html (posing questions and issues for 
managers to consider in the context of buying and selling distressed assets). 
 58. See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Kodak and KKR: Distressed Debt Investing 101, WSJ.COM (Sept. 
17, 2009, 10:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/09/17/kkr-and-kodak-distressed-debt-investing-
101/ (explaining tight covenants and high interest rates associated with loan from distressed-debt 
investor).  
 59. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1237–42 (2006); George W. Kuney, Hijacking 
Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 22–23 (2004); David A. Skeel, Creditors‟ Ball: The 
“New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918, 923–27 (2003). 
 60. See Harner, supra note 3, at 718–20, 725–27 (discussing Allied Holdings and Kmart Chapter 
11 cases—both involving takeovers by distressed debtholders who purchased the majority of their debt 
at steep discounts after the Chapter 11 filings). 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TAKEOVER STRATEGIES 
The American corporation generally is characterized by the separation 
of ownership and management.
61
 Shareholders are the residual owners of 
the company, but the board of directors and the officers selected by the 
board manage the company‘s affairs.62 The separation of ownership and 
control often is cited as the source of agency costs in corporate 
governance, including concerns regarding inefficient and unaccountable 
management.
63
 It also, however, exposes management to a loss of control 
through various corporate takeover strategies. 
This Part summarizes the development of corporate takeover strategies 
and the regulation of that activity in equity-based takeovers. This 
discussion highlights the potential benefits of corporate takeover activity 
and the potential detriments that spawn regulation. The history of equity-
based takeovers foreshadows the increasing use of debt-based takeovers 
and the potential problems with that practice.  
A. From Proxy Contests to Tender Offers 
A shareholder‘s primary rights with respect to the corporation are to 
receive dividends, elect members to the board of directors, vote on 
extraordinary transactions, and sell their shares.
64
 Shareholders also may 
bring derivative litigation, and in some cases, direct litigation to protect 
 
 
 61. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32, at 120. 
 62. For a discussion of shareholders‘ rights as the residual owners of a corporation, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) (explaining existing 
rights and urging more comprehensive rights for shareholders); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish 
Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538, 541–42 (2006) 
(―According to [options] theory, once a firm has issued debt, debtholders and holders of equity both 
share contingent control and bear residual risk.‖); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder 
Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804–05 (2007) (―[W]hile shareholders may share in the wealth when the 
corporation does well and suffer when the firm does poorly, so may employees, creditors, and other 
stakeholders.‖). For examples of the authority granted boards of directors, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(a) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007). 
 63. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32, at 121–25 (discussing agency cost concerns); Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (same); William W. Bratton, Berle and Means 
Reconsidered at the Century‟s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001) (discussing agency costs and the 
contributions of Berle and Means to that analysis); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach 
Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
225, 235–36 (2007) (―The result of our system of dispersed share ownership is a collective action 
problem that leads inexorably to rational shareholder apathy.‖).  
 64. See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of Shareholders, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 407 (2006) (discussing four general categories of shareholders‘ rights, economic rights, control 
rights, information rights, and litigation rights). 
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the interests of the corporation or the shareholders.
65
 Accordingly, 
shareholders have limited ability to impact directly most management and 
operational decisions relating to the corporation. 
In theory, the shareholders‘ right to elect directors should enable them 
to guide the direction of the company by removing directors who deviate 
from a desired path and replacing them with a new board of directors.
66
 
The new directors could be individuals identified by the shareholders, thus 
giving the shareholders some confidence in and control over the 
management of the company. The corporate proxy process facilitates such 
shareholder-sponsored slates of directors.
67
 
Initially, parties wanting to gain control of a company without the 
support of existing management tried to invoke the proxy process to 
achieve their objectives.
68
 These individuals encountered the same types of 
issues with the proxy process faced by all shareholders—the process is 
expensive, tedious, and tends to be slanted in favor of existing 
management.
69
 Even after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
adopted federal rules to govern the proxy process, parties had little success 
using proxies in control contests.
70
 
 
 
 65. See, e.g., Allan B. Cooper et al., Too Close for Comfort: Application of Shareholder‟s 
Derivative Actions to Disputes Involving Closely Held Corporations, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 171, 
175–76 (2009) (explaining distinction between derivative and direct suits as ―[i]f the harm was to the 
corporation (so that any shareholder harm was indirect), shareholders could pursue the claim only as a 
derivative action‖ but ―where the corporation infringed a shareholder‘s direct right, the shareholder 
could pursue the case as a direct action‖).  
 66. See, e.g., Harding v. Heritage Health Prods., 98 P.3d 945, 947 (Colo. App. 2004) (asserting 
―fundamental principle that shareholders ultimately have the power to elect the board, remove the 
board, and modify the corporation‘s bylaws‖). 
 67. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, SEC Set to Open Up Proxy Process, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2010, at 
B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704741904575409680246527908. 
html (―Currently, if shareholders want to propose a slate of directors, they need to pay out of their own 
pockets for a separate proxy fight. Under the new rule allowing them to put their own nominees next to 
the company‘s, the company would foot the cost.‖). 
 68. See, e.g., Philip N. Hablutzel & David R. Selmer, Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and 
Overview, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 203, 203–06 (1988) (―Before the Williams Act was passed . . . the 
method of a hostile takeover was to conduct a proxy fight.‖); see also 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. 
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 1–57 (2003) (explaining general use of proxy process in 
takeover attempts).  
 69. See, e.g., Richard W. Barrett, Note, Elephant in the Boardroom?: Counting the Vote in 
Corporate Elections, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 168 (2009) (highlighting problems in the proxy process 
because ―its complexity, the need for behind-the-scenes adjustment of the vote, and lack of verification 
assure a significant incidence of errors, and they create opportunities for abuse‖); see also David F. 
Larcker & Brian Tayan, Proxy Access: A Sheep, or Wolf in Sheep‘s Clothing? 1 (July 7, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Washington University Law Review) (―The shareholder must 
bear the full cost of preparing and distributing this set of materials, obtaining the list of shareholders, 
and soliciting support for its candidates. Because of the considerable cost involved, proxy contests 
occur infrequently and in many cases are not successful.‖). 
 70. See Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 204–05 (―It was said during the 1950s that 
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A different tactic eventually emerged as the preferred course for 
facilitating unsolicited changes in corporate control—the tender offer.71 
Rather than soliciting the votes of shareholders in support of a new slate of 
directors, parties seeking control pursued the shares themselves.
72
 As 
described below, many parties adopting this approach were dubbed 
―corporate raiders,‖ and commentators continue to debate the value of 
their takeover practices, as well as the utility of takeover regulation. 
1. Corporate Raiders and Hostile Takeovers 
A takeover typically references a change of control at the corporation.
73
 
Most modern takeovers are accomplished through some type of tender 
offer. Those offers may involve different consideration (e.g., cash, 
securities, or some combination of both); they may be self-financed by the 
offeror or through another means, including high-yield bonds; and they 
may proceed in multiple steps or in a contingent form.
74
 ―Whether 
takeovers are considered friendly or hostile generally is determined by the 
reaction of the target company‘s board of directors.‖75 
 
 
insurgents were not likely to win such a fight unless dividends had not been paid for several years.‖). 
The proxy provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and the related rules passed by the SEC 
were intended to level the playing field in the proxy process. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 
404, § 14, 48 Stat. 881, 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 
(2010). 
 71. See Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 68, at 205–06. A tender offer generally is defined as ―a 
public offer to all shareholders to tender their shares at a particular price.‖ 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, 
supra note 68, at 24. Tender offers and corporate mergers and acquisitions did not develop in the 
1960s; rather, the first notable wave of such transactions dates to the late 1800s. See STEVEN M. 
DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR 10–19 (2009) (explaining history of mergers and acquisitions); PATRICK A. 
GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 29–57 (4th ed. 2007) (same). 
The 1960s and 1970s saw increasing use of these tactics in the hostile takeover context. See infra Part 
II.A.1. 
 72. ―A tender offer can be a means of obtaining that which an offeror cannot otherwise obtain by 
negotiation.‖ 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 1–17; see also Alexander R. Hammer, M-G-
M Is Cautious on Tender Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1969, at 69 (―Mr. Kerkorian, the financier who 
already owns almost a quarter of the common stock of M-G-M, moved to increase his holdings in the 
company by making a tender offer to buy 620,000 M-G-M shares at $42 each.‖). 
 73. ―A takeover is an attempt by a bidder (‗raider‘) to acquire control of a subject company 
(‗target‘) through acquisition of some or all of its outstanding shares.‖ 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, 
supra note 68, at 1–10.1. 
 74. See, e.g., The Developing Meaning of “Tender Offer” Under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1973) (―Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act 
(1934 Act) regulate ‗tender offers,‘ but at no point do they define what a ‗tender offer‘ is. As a result 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), courts, and practitioners have had the task of 
determining, in an increasing number of instances, whether particular securities transactions are tender 
offers and thus subject to the rather extensive regulatory requirements of these sections.‖); Hammer, 
supra note 72. 
 75. GAUGHAN, supra note 71, at 55.  
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An unwelcome or hostile takeover places the board of directors and 
management in a difficult situation. Unlike most shareholders, the party 
pursuing the takeover has a unified message—frequently with an anti-
management slant—and the resources to make that message heard. For 
example, Carl Icahn launched an expensive and provocative takeover bid 
for Yahoo targeted at management‘s decision not to pursue a merger with 
Microsoft.
76
 
Accordingly, hostile takeovers place existing management on the 
defensive. The offeror‘s challenges to management‘s skills or policies may 
be warranted. In these cases, the hostile takeover attempt may discipline 
management, give voice to the concern of other shareholders, and increase 
value—either through a change in management‘s policies or a sale of the 
company to the offeror or a competing bidder. 
Alternatively, if the offeror‘s challenges are meritless or based on 
issues on which reasonably prudent business people could differ, the 
hostile takeover may be an expensive distraction for management and its 
shareholders. In these cases, management is required to divert attention 
and resources from company operations and address the allegations and 
tactics of management. The value of shareholders‘ stock may suffer and 
the company‘s products and reputation may be publicly tarnished, at least 
for a short period of time. Although those consequences seem 
counterproductive, they may be profitable for an offeror depending on its 
ultimate motives, including arbitrage plays and competing investments. 
Regardless of whether the offeror‘s allegations have merit, the offeror‘s 
objectives, investment horizon, or post-acquisition agenda may prove 
detrimental to the long-term interests of the company. The ―buy and bust‖ 
or ―raiding‖ concerns associated with takeovers relate to the practice of 
buying a company and selling off its ―crown jewel‖ or other assets in a 
manner that generates short-term profit for the investor, but really destroys 
any long-term opportunities or value for the company and its other 
 
 
 76. Sincerely Yours, Carl, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 4, 2008, 2:50 PM), http://dealbook. 
nytimes.com/2008/06/04/sincerely-yours-carl/ (―‗I am amazed at the length Jerry Yang and the Yahoo 
board have gone to in order to entrench their positions and keep shareholders from deciding if they 
wished to sell to Microsoft. . . . I and many of your shareholders believe that the only way to salvage 
Yahoo in the long if not short run is to merge with Microsoft.‘‖ (quoting Icahn‘s letter to Yahoo 
chairman Roy Bostock)); Miguel Helft, Yahoo Deal Wards Off Proxy Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/22/technology/22yahoo.html (―Mr. Icahn agreed to drop his 
proxy bid to replace Yahoo‘s directors in exchange for three seats on an expanded board. . . . Mr. 
Icahn bought about 69 million shares of Yahoo, or roughly 5 percent of the company, at about $25 
each.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] ACTIVIST DISTRESSED DEBTHOLDERS 175 
 
 
 
 
stakeholders.
77
 These practices are also a concern in the debt-based 
takeover context. 
The term ―raiding‖ also describes a situation where the offeror does not 
necessarily intend to take over the company, but launches a takeover 
attempt to receive a higher return on its shares of the target. Those 
enhanced returns may flow from the payment of greenmail, market 
movement created by rumors of the offeror‘s activities, or the involvement 
of a ―white knight‖ or other competing bidder. For example, Paul 
Bilzerian—who engaged in hostile takeover activity primarily in the 
1980s—made significant profits through these ―takeover attempts‖ before 
he completed his first acquisition in 1988.
78
 This type of profit seeking is 
referenced above in the context of questionable challenges to existing 
management, but certainly is not limited to those situations.  
2. The Mechanics of a Hostile Takeover 
As noted above, equity-based takeovers may take a variety of forms. 
The offeror may offer to purchase the target‘s shares for cash, the debt or 
equity securities of itself or another company, or some combination of 
cash and securities.
79
 The form of the takeover and the tactics used to 
approach the target‘s management and shareholders largely turn on the 
offeror‘s identity and objectives. 
For example, the offeror may try to bypass management and go directly 
to shareholders through a tender offer. An offeror may even be able to start 
this process under the radar, quietly buying up the target‘s shares on the 
open market or in private transactions. Many offerors have used this 
 
 
 77. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 8, at 1863 (explaining ―bust-up‖ takeovers and 
observing that ―[t]akeovers motivated by such objectives are believed to threaten jobs, established 
customer and supplier relationships, tax revenues, charitable contributions, and other economic and 
social benefits provided by resident companies to local communities‖); see also Holderness & 
Sheehan, supra note 5, at 556 (―[T]he most prevalent view is that [corporate control investors] reduce 
the wealth of their fellow stockholders.‖). 
 78. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Corporate Raider: Paul Bilzerian; A Scrappy Takeover Artist Rises 
to the Top, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/24/business/corporate-raider 
-paul-bilzerian-a-scrappy-takeover-artist-rises-to-the-top.html. 
 79. See supra Part II.A; see also 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 119–20, 139–40 
(explaining different consideration exchanges possible in takeovers and observing that many all-cash 
offers are consummated through multi-step transactions). A general breakdown of takeover strategies 
and consideration might include six broad categories: tender offers; exchange offers; open market 
accumulation; creeping tender offers; bear hug letters; and proxy contests. See DAVID C. JOHNSTON & 
DANIEL JOHNSTON, INTRODUCTION TO OIL COMPANY FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 266 (2006). These 
approaches can overlap and some are discussed in more detail below. For an explanation of creeping 
tender offers, see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY REGULATION 628 
(2004). 
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approach, with notable past examples including Carl Icahn in his 
acquisition of Trans World Airlines and T. Boone Pickens in his 
acquisition of Unocal.
80
 An offeror often benefits from the element of 
surprise accompanying this type of ―secret accumulation.‖ Management is 
unaware of the offeror‘s presence until the offeror has a foothold in the 
company‘s stock, often placing management in a defensive stance. 
Although the element of surprise still exists in equity-based takeover 
activity, the federal regulations discussed below require, among other 
things, disclosure once an offeror has accumulated five percent of the 
target‘s stock. These regulations mitigate the complete surprise and often 
helpless management that resulted in ―Saturday Night Specials,‖ which 
were popular prior to and for a short time after the enactment of the 
Williams Act in 1968.
81
 In a Saturday Night Special, an offeror would 
accumulate as much of the target‘s stock as possible over the weekend, 
making the takeover almost inevitable once the markets opened again on 
Monday.
82
 The target‘s management frequently had no defense or 
meaningful response and shareholders who did not sell their stock during 
the weekend frenzy often received a lower price. As discussed below, 
 
 
 80. See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 12, n.42, 16 (1987) (discussing strategy of quiet stock accumulation and noting examples of 
strategy).  
 81. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2007) (―The ‗Saturday Night Special‘ was a favorite: in one form, a 
bidder would embark on a pre-offer buying raid to establish a substantial beachhead of ownership at a 
reduced price.‖). After the enactment of the Williams Act, the structure of ―Saturday Night Specials‖ 
changed slightly to mitigate the effect of the original seven day waiting period imposed for tender 
offers. See id. at 216–18 (explaining the use of ―Saturday Night Specials‖ both before and after the 
Williams Act and the origins of the term). For example, the offeror would announce the tender offer at 
the start of the weekend, reducing the time for management to react or impose defensive measures 
before the expiration of the seven days and the launch of the tender offer. See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra 
note 71, at 51–53 (providing examples of Saturday Night Specials after 1969); Guhan Subramanian, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 631 n.48 (2003) (―A Saturday 
Night Special is a tender offer that is open for only a short period of time, typically just a few days, 
thereby forcing shareholders to decide quickly whether or not to tender.‖). The SEC amended certain 
provisions of the Williams Act in 1976 to increase the waiting period applicable to tender offers to 
twenty days, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of Saturday Night Specials in the equity-
based context. See Davidoff, supra, at 223 (―The SEC changes effectively eliminated all vestiges of 
the old ‗Saturday Night Special‘ for any and all tender offers: new Rule 14e-1 lengthened the 
minimum offering period to twenty business days from the de facto seven calendar days required by 
old Rule 14d-5.‖). 
 82. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 81, at 216 (explaining mechanics of Saturday Night Specials); 
Robert A. Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the 
Counterproductive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 389, 391 (1989) 
(stating that ―the offer was typically announced on a Friday afternoon, giving target shareholders only 
a week to ten days to decide whether to tender their shares. The timing of the announcement prevented 
any effective response from target management until the following Monday, when part of the offering 
period had already expired.‖). 
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debt-based takeovers have many of the characteristics of the original 
Saturday Night Specials. 
Offerors also may use a ―bear hug‖ approach to achieve their 
objectives.
83
 In this approach, the offeror approaches management about 
an acquisition while simultaneously announcing its offer for the target‘s 
shares. ―The publicity of a bear hug is . . . meant to stir shareholders to 
apply pressure to the company‘s board.‖84 This approach also can be used 
as a scare tactic with management, invoking ―[a]n 11th-hour approach by 
the acquiring company‘s executives, who go to the target‘s head office late 
on Friday afternoon to say something like, ‗We‘d love to work out a deal 
over the weekend, but if we can‘t come to an agreement, here‘s the press 
release that will go out first thing Monday morning outlining the terms of 
our hostile takeover.‘‖85 
Moreover, a takeover may be characterized as hostile if the offeror 
enters the picture after the company announces a consensual deal. The 
offeror‘s presence often initiates an auction and competitive bidding 
process for the company, or otherwise tries to force a change of control on 
the company. Offerors or parties seeking control may use a combination of 
tactics, including the proxy process. The success or value of their tactics 
often is in the eye of the beholder. 
B. Regulation of Equity-Based Takeovers 
Prior to 1968, tender offers and most other takeover activities were 
largely unregulated.
86
 The increased use of all-cash tender offers and the 
development of other tactics like the Saturday Night Special in the 1960s 
 
 
 83. See, e.g., 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 1-36, 1-35–1-38 (―In the ‗simple‘ bear 
hug, the raider notifies the target of a proposed tender offer or business combination at a specified 
price and upon specified terms, which may include any warranties or conditions the offeror desires.‖). 
 84. CHRIS ROUSH, SHOW ME THE MONEY: WRITING BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STORIES FOR 
MASS COMMUNICATION 133 (2d ed. 2011). Roush provides several examples of the ―bear hug‖ 
takeover tactic, including EchoStar Communication‘s bid for Hughes Electronics. Furthermore, he 
notes that ―[s]ince EchoStart made its bear hug, four lawsuits have been filed against G.M. [Hughes‘ 
parent company] by shareholders effectively pushing the company to consider EchoStar‘s offer.‖ Id.; 
see also ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009); David Whitford, When a Takeover Battle 
Goes Nuclear, CNNMONEY.COM (July 14, 2009, 10:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/06/ 
news/companies/exelon_nrg_electric_utilities.fortune/ (―‗I guess this is what they say is sort of a 
classic bear-hug situation . . . a gradual, rolling dispiriting of the opposition. The whole idea of a bear 
hug is that it becomes an inevitable, self-fulfilling prophecy. And, uh, it‘s succeeding pretty well on 
that path.‘‖ (quoting David Crane, CEO of NRG Energy)). 
 85. Madhavi Acharya-Tom Yew, Insider Trading Trial Gave a Slice of Bay Street Life, 
INVESTORVOICE.CA (July 15, 2005, 1:00 AM), http://www.investorvoice.ca/Scandals/Rankin/AR23. 
htm.  
 86. See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 79, at 615.  
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caused regulators to take notice. The result was the Williams Act, which is 
a combination of disclosure requirements and certain procedural rules 
applicable in the equity-based takeover context.
87
 
This Part explores certain provisions of the Williams Act and related 
state anti-takeover statutes.
88
 It also summarizes the debate concerning the 
value of takeover activity and the propriety of takeover regulation. 
Although this debate is not directly applicable to debt-based takeovers, it 
informs the discussion of appropriate regulation in that context. 
1. The Williams Act 
The Williams Act amended the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to 
regulate certain stock purchases and tender offers.
89
 The legislative history 
to the Williams Act suggests that Congress did not view it specifically as 
anti-takeover legislation.
90
 As Senator Williams explained, ―[the bill] 
avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or 
in favor of the person making the takeover bid.‖91 Accordingly, a primary 
purpose of the Williams Act appears to be providing more information and 
time to investors to facilitate more thoughtful decisions in the context of 
equity-based takeovers.
92
 
To that end, the Williams Act introduced mandatory disclosure 
requirements for persons acquiring five percent or more of a company‘s 
 
 
 87. Some commentators describe the Williams Act as substantive regulation as well. Compare 
Davidoff, supra note 81, at 219 (describing the Williams Act as imposing ―substantive and procedural 
requirements‖), with Johnson & Millon, supra note 8, at 1890 (―[B]esides implementing provisions 
aimed at transmitting information to shareholders, the Williams Act and related SEC regulations 
establish procedural guidelines governing the conduct of tender offers.‖). The distinction between 
substantive and procedural securities regulation is not relevant to the focus of this Article. 
 88. Specifically, this section discusses sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Williams Act. For a more 
thorough exploration of the Williams Act, see 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 1–12–1–
14; LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 79, at 615–45. 
 89. The Williams Act does not define the term ―tender offer.‖ See 2 LIPTON & STEINBERGER 
TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 2–24. One commentator suggests that Congress intended to use the 
commonly-accepted meaning of tender offer, which is ―a public offer to all shareholders to tender their 
shares at a particular price.‖ Id. For a thorough discussion of the elements of a tender offer and the 
courts‘ analysis of the same, see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 79, at 629–32. 
 90. See HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN 
CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 3 (1967); HARLEY O. STAGGERS, DISCLOSURE 
OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711 (1968). This balanced approach to 
takeover regulation is in contrast to the title and approach of Senator Williams‘ original bill, 
―Protection Against Corporate Raiders.‖ See Davidoff, supra note 81, at 217. 
 91. See 113 CONG. REC. 854–56, 24,664–65 (1967). 
 92. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: 
Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1437 (1991) (―The Act relieves 
the undue pressure on shareholders by ensuring investors have more time to make informed and 
rational decisions.‖). 
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equity securities. Under the current version of section 13(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, ―[a]ny person who, after acquiring directly or 
indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which 
is registered pursuant to section 78l . . . is directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten 
days after such acquisition, send‖ a statement of such ownership to the 
SEC, any exchanges on which the company is listed, and the company 
itself.
93
 Section 13(d) and Rule 13d-1 detail the type of information that a 
purchaser must disclose in the statement.
94
 These provisions were intended 
to ―alert investors in securities markets to potential changes in corporate 
control and to provide them with an opportunity to evaluate the effect of 
these potential changes.‖95 
In the context of debt-based takeovers, section 13(d) has two important 
qualifiers. First, it applies only to the acquisition of equity securities of 
public companies.
96
 Second, it uses the concept of ―acquiring directly or 
indirectly the beneficial ownership‖ and defines ―person‖ broadly to try to 
capture all potential acquisitions that might lead to a tender offer or 
takeover attempt.
97
 These provisions try to deter investment schemes 
 
 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). The disclosure trigger originally was ten percent beneficial 
ownership, with [seven] days to file the appropriate statement. These provisions were subsequently 
amended. See Davidoff, supra note 81, at 219. 
 94. This statement, referred to as a Schedule 13D, must include, among other things, the identity 
of the beneficial owner, the source of funds used to purchase the stock, and the purpose of the 
acquisition. § 78m(d)(1). Rule 13d-1 permits certain persons to file a shorter version of Schedule 13D, 
known as a Schedule 13G, if that person:  
has acquired such securities in the ordinary course of his business and not with the purpose 
nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer, nor in connection with 
or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, including any transaction 
subject to Rule 13d-3(b). 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (2010). Rule 13d-1, as well as the types of parties excluded from the 
requirements of section 13(d), underscores the regulations‘ focus on increased disclosures from parties 
anticipating a takeover. 
 95. Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365–66 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Letter from Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy 2–3 (Mar. 7, 2011) (on file with Washington 
University Law Review and available at www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf) (describing 
investor focus of the disclosure rules). 
 96. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act defines ―equity security‖ as  
any stock or similar security; or any security future on any such security; or any security 
convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any other 
security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or 
appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors, to treat as an equity security. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (2006). 
 97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), (3) (2006). Section 13(d)(3) provides that ―[w]hen two or more 
persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, 
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designed to avoid the section 13(d) disclosure triggers, which also is a 
potential issue in debt-based takeovers. 
The Williams Act also regulates tender offers in sections 14(d) and 
(e).
98
 For example, section 14(d) and Rule 14d-6 require the filing of a 
disclosure statement in connection with any tender offer that specifies, 
among other things, the identity of the offeror and target company, the 
amount of equity securities being sought through the tender offer, the 
amount and type of consideration being offered, and any applicable 
deadlines.
99
 Section 14(d) also gives shareholders who tender their stock 
certain rights, including the right to withdraw their tenders and to receive a 
pro rata distribution when the tender offer is oversubscribed.
100
 Finally, 
section 14(e) provides that it is  
unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, 
or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender 
offer.
101
 
2. Anti-Takeover Legislation and Defensive Tactics 
The Williams Act failed to deter hostile takeover activity. In fact, aided 
by creative financing alternatives, takeover activity spiked during the 
1970s.
102
 This increased activity prompted a majority of states to enact 
anti-takeover legislation.
103
 State regulation of tender offers has generated 
rich commentary regarding federalism and the value of takeovers.
104
 
 
 
holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a ‗person‘ for 
the purposes of this subsection.‖ § 78m(d)(3); see also Rule 13d-5. Moreover, Rule 13d-3 explains that  
a beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, directly or indirectly, through any 
contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares: [v]oting power 
which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such security; and/or [i]nvestment 
power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security. 
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-3(a)(1)-(2) (2010). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), (e) (2006). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (2010). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5), (7) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-7, d-10. 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2006). 
 102. See, e.g., Matheson & Olson, supra note 92, at 1437 (―Despite the Williams Act, by the mid-
1970s the takeover boom had begun an extended expansion that would carry through the megamergers 
of the late 1980s.‖). 
 103. See 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 1–14 (stating that this increase in takeover 
activity ―[r]esulted in more than thirty-five states enacting laws to regulate tender offers by 1982‖). 
For a thoughtful discussion of the non-shareholder interests that arguably motivate state anti-takeover 
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The substance of state anti-takeover regulation has evolved over time. 
These regulations first focused on enhanced disclosure, longer deliberation 
periods, and overall fairness, which the Supreme Court invalidated in 
Edgar v. MITE Corp.
105
 Subsequent statutes have focused on the corporate 
governance aspects of takeover activity, such as limitations on ownership 
or voting rights of stock above a certain percentage (e.g., no voting rights 
for shares in excess of 20 percent or not permitted to acquire more than 20 
percent) and moratoriums on the consummation of certain transactions.
106
 
In addition, states have enacted statutes authorizing boards of directors to 
implement takeover defenses and clarifying the board‘s fiduciary duties in 
the takeover context (e.g., no heightened standard of care or an ability to 
consider the interests of constituents other than shareholders).
107
 
Takeover defenses have garnered a lot of attention, both in the courts 
and in the investor community. Common defenses include shareholders‘ 
rights plans, voting rights plans, staggered boards, greenmail, the use of 
white knights, and the pac-man response.
108
 Commentators and investors 
 
 
legislation, see Johnson & Millon, supra note 8, at 1863–64. They explain non-shareholder interests at 
stake such that:  
With the threat to incumbent corporate managements, these concerns have occupied the 
legislators‘ attention as they respond to heightened takeover activity. Thus, for obvious 
economic and political reasons, deterrence of tender offers, not ‗investor protection,‘ is 
emerging as the states‘ principal motivation in passing takeover laws, a fact state legislators 
are beginning to acknowledge more candidly. 
Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race 
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169–70 (1999) (citing articles 
discussing corporate law and federalism beginning with Bill Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974)). For a general discussion of the evolution of 
state anti-takeover statutes, see Matheson & Olson, supra note 92, at 1438–52. 
 105. 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see also 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 1–15. 
 106. See SANJAI BHAGAT & RICHARD H. JEFFERIS, JR., THE ECONOMETRICS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE STUDIES 8 (2002); 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 68, at 1–15–1–16; Barzuza, 
supra note 11. 
 107. See Barzuza, supra note 11, at 1989 (―Thirty-five states have adopted directors‘ duties 
statutes, also known as ‗other constituency‘ statutes. Typically, these statutes allow directors to take 
into account the interests of constituencies other than shareholders and/or the long-term value of the 
firm. Sometimes, in addition, they apply weaker fiduciary duties on managers‘ use of defensive 
tactics.‖). 
 108. For a general discussion of common takeover defenses, see PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, 
MERGERS: WHAT CAN GO WRONG AND HOW TO PREVENT IT 246–49 (2005). A shareholders‘ rights 
plan, commonly called a poison pill, typically gives  
 target shareholders the right to buy shares of the target (a ‗flip-in‘ provision), the acquirer 
(a ‗flip-over‘ provision), or both at a substantially discounted price in the event that a single 
shareholder, or an affiliated group of shareholders, acquires more than a specified percentage 
of the company‘s shares (typically between ten and twenty percent).‖  
See Subramanian, supra note 81, at 625. In a voting rights plan, ―managers use a defensive tactic that 
interferes with shareholder voting rights, to circumvent the hostile bidder‘s attempt to use the proxy 
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debate the value impact of takeover defenses, which directly relates to the 
utility of takeovers themselves.
109
 Investors tend to ebb and flow on the 
issue depending on the economic environment.
110
 
Notwithstanding the valuation debate and anti-takeover legislation, 
hostile takeovers remain an eminent feature of the corporate landscape. 
They arguably are more difficult to consummate in the current regulatory 
environment, but that may change as the United States and other countries 
reevaluate their proxy access and other shareholders‘ rights and 
governance mechanisms. Indeed, giving shareholders greater access to the 
corporate proxy may renew the prominence of proxies in control contests. 
As policymakers consider their stance on proxy access and takeover 
regulation more generally, they also need to consider the impact of debt-
based takeovers. The remainder of this Article explores this issue and 
offers some guidance for policymakers in that endeavor. 
III. THE MECHANICS OF DEBT-BASED TAKEOVERS 
Equity-based takeovers often focus on realizing untapped value at the 
target company.
111
 In pursuing that objective, the offeror tries to acquire 
control of the target company at the lowest possible price, although that 
generally involves paying fair market value for the stock. The fair market 
 
 
machinery.‖ Barzuza, supra note 11, at 1987; see also Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 
651, 670 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that there must be a compelling justification for blocking 
shareholders from exercising their voting rights). Staggered boards ―provide antitakeover protection 
both by (i) forcing any hostile bidder, no matter when it emerges, to wait at least one year to gain 
control of the board and (ii) requiring such a bidder to win two elections far apart in time rather than a 
one-time referendum on its offer.‖ Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (2002); see also 
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. WHX Corp., 967 F. Supp. 59, 64–65 (D. Conn. 1997) (upholding business 
judgment rule to staggered board defensive tactic). Greenmail ―refers to payments made by the target 
company to buy back shares owned by a potential acquirer at a premium over their fair market value. 
In exchange, the acquirer normally agrees to rescind its hostile takeover bid.‖ Soo-Jeong Ahn et al., 
Asia/Pacific, 43 INT‘L LAW. 1007, 1022–23 n.118 (2009); see also Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 58–
59 (Del. Ch. 1960) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty when corporate funds were used to purchase 
shares of acquired corporate stock). A white knight is a means of avoiding the takeover bid ―by selling 
to a friendly buyer.‖ Barzuza, supra note 11, at 1980; see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (requiring a higher standard involving sale to highest 
bidder when ―white knight‖ is implicated). In a pac-man response, the goal is for the targeted business 
to turn the tables: eat the other before being eaten. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
871, 875 n.11 (2002).  
 109. See, e.g., Barzuza, supra note 11 (supporting enhanced fiduciary duties of Unocal, Revlon, 
and Blasius); Bebchuk et al., supra note 108. 
 110. See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra note 71, at 213 (noting that Goldman Sachs helped pioneer the 
recapitalization anti-takeover defense).  
 111. See supra Part II. 
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value threshold stems from market demand, state law appraisal rights, 
management fiduciary duties, and the other protections discussed above 
for shareholders in the tender offer and takeover contexts.
112
 
Conversely, investors who use debt-based takeovers to gain control of 
undervalued companies can typically do so at bargain prices.
113
 Part of the 
bargain relates to the distressed financial condition of the target 
company.
114
 The other part, however, arises from the secrecy and lack of 
transparency associated with the distressed debt market. As one 
commentator observed, these investors ―[q]uietly buy up as much cheap, 
delinquent debt as possible and then fight it out in bankruptcy court for a 
lucrative settlement that transforms the debt into a large share of company 
stock.‖115 Notably, this strategy works outside of bankruptcy as well, 
particularly in the private company context where the parties do not need 
to invoke the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate a debt-for-equity exchange.
116
 
To appreciate the consequences of the lack of transparency in the debt-
based takeover context, this Part examines a series of debt-based takeovers 
in the newspaper industry.
117
 Although the target companies in these 
transactions are all in the newspaper industry, investors employ similar 
loan-to-own investment techniques in the manufacturing, retail, service, 
and other industries.
118
 This Article uses the newspaper industry solely as 
an example of the potential for gamesmanship and abuse in debt-based 
takeovers. The case studies also lay the groundwork for the discussion in 
Part IV of disclosure requirements to protect all of a target‘s stakeholders 
both in and outside of bankruptcy. 
 
 
 112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Hotchkiss et al., supra note 21, at 25 (―Transactions prices, however, are significantly 
lower than those paid for nonbankrupt firms matched on size and industry.‖). 
 114. STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR SPECULATIVE 
INVESTORS 6 (2005) (categorizing distressed debt by reference to Moody‘s and S&P, with BB as 
―speculative‖ grade on a ―10-grade scheme ranging from AAA to D‖). 
 115. Michael Oneal, New Breed of Newspaper Owners Writing a Different Story, CHI. TRIB., June 
6, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-06/business/ct-biz-0606-angelo-gordon--20100606 
_1_new-owners-newspaper-industry-angelo-gordon.  
 116. For example, Platinum Equity reportedly purchased the San Diego Union-Tribune for a 
bargain price in an out-of-court sale. See PEW PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM & POYNTER 
INST., THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2010, http://stateofthemedia.org/2010/newspapers-summary-
essay/ownership/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2011); see also Thomas Kupper, Union-Tribune Sold to 
Platinum Equity, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM (Mar. 18, 2009, 1:17 PM), http://www.signonsandiego. 
com/news/2009/mar/18/bn18sale105226/ (explaining details of sale). 
 117. For an overview of a similar strategy in the casino entertainment industry, see Janet 
Morrissey, Why Carl Icahn Is Wagering Big on Casinos, TIME.COM (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.time. 
com/time/business/article/0,8599,1974104,00.html.  
 118. See supra Part I.A. 
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A. A Case Study of Industry-Specific Debt Opportunities 
The advent of the Internet and evolution of communication 
technologies pose significant challenges for the newspaper industry.
119
 In 
the United States, newspaper sales have dropped significantly, as people 
increasingly turn to the Internet and their wireless devices for news, 
information, and entertainment.
120
 ―Between 2008 and early 2010, eight 
major newspaper chains declared bankruptcy, several big city papers shut 
down, and many laid off reporters and editors, imposed pay reductions, cut 
the size of the physical newspaper, or turned to Web-only publications.‖121 
Faltering business models and profit margins often present 
opportunities for distressed-debt investors. An investor‘s decision to seize 
any particular opportunity may depend on that investor‘s investment 
strategies, existing portfolio, and in-house expertise. Some investors 
choose to concentrate their efforts in certain industries. Angelo, Gordon & 
Co. (Angelo Gordon), Alden Global Capital, Avenue Capital, and Oaktree 
Capital Management (Oaktree), among others, selected the newspaper 
industry.
122
  
 
 
 119. John Gardner, Newspaper Industry Facing Huge Challenges, POST INDEP. (Colo.), Jan. 5, 
2009, http://www.postindependent.com/article/20090105/VALLEYNEWS/901059997. Gardner explains 
issues facing the newspaper industry and notes that ―[m]ore and more people are going online or using 
wireless devices to get news and information. That could be the surest sign that the printed medium is 
on its way out.‖ Id. This trend exists not only in the United States, but also to varying degrees in other 
countries. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE EVOLUTION OF NEWS AND THE 
INTERNET (2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/24/45559596.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) 
(―Only five OECD countries for which data is available have experienced a decline [in the newspaper 
market in the period 2004-2008], the United States being particularly affected (-20%), followed by 
Japan (-9%), the United Kingdom (-7%), Canada (-2%) and The Netherlands (-1%).‖).  
 120. See Tim Arango, Fall in Newspaper Sales Accelerates to Pass 7%, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/business/media/28paper.html 
(―[D]eclines [in print circulation] ranged from 20.6 percent for The New York Post, to a slight 0.4 
percent drop for The Chicago Sun-Times.‖). The industry‘s problems became evident as early as 2004 
and 2005. See Frank Ahrens, Hard News, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2005, at F1, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37138-2005Feb19.html (―The venerable newspaper is in 
trouble. Under sustained assault from cable television, the Internet, all-news radio and lifestyles so 
cram-packed they leave little time for the daily paper, the industry is struggling to remake itself.‖). 
 121. SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40700, THE U.S. NEWSPAPER 
INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40700.pdf.  
 122. See Michael Oneal, Hedge Funds Gain Clout in Newspaper Industry, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 
2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/06/business/la-fi-tribune-20100606 (―Over the last year, 
bankrupt newspaper companies including Tribune Co., owner of the Los Angeles Times, KTLA-TV 
Channel 5 and other news organizations, have been overrun by a category of stealthy ‗distressed debt‘ 
hedge funds. These include Angelo, Gordon & Co. and Alden Global Capital, both of New York, and 
Oaktree Capital Management of Los Angeles.‖); Popular U.S. Tabloids in Trouble?, CBSNEWS.COM, 
Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/01/business/main7011590.shtml (noting that 
Angelo Gordon and Avenue Capital are bondholders of ailing American Media, Inc.). 
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Distressed-debt investors largely invoke similar tactics, and many 
commentators debate the value of their activities. This Article analyzes 
one of these tactics—the loan-to-own strategy—and uses Angelo 
Gordon‘s investments in the newspaper industry to illustrate the use and 
consequences of the tactic.
123
 Angelo Gordon‘s activities in the newspaper 
industry facilitate analysis of both in- and out-of-court debt-based 
takeovers, disputes relating to loan-to-own acquisitions, and management 
critiques of the strategy. This Part of the article first explains the 
circumstances of each takeover and then discusses the common elements 
of, and similar issues raised by, all of the transactions. 
1. American Media, Inc. 
American Media, Inc. publishes several print news magazines, 
including The National Enquirer, Star, and Muscle & Fitness.
124
 Unlike 
many newspaper publishers, American Media‘s primary publications do 
not rely on subscriptions, but rather one-off sales at stores and newspaper 
stands. Nevertheless, it has encountered many of the same challenges 
facing others in the newspaper industry.
125
 
American Media started aggressively pursuing refinancing options in 
2008.
126
 In early 2009, reports suggested that American Media found a 
solution—an out-of-court debt-for-equity exchange with its senior 
bondholders.
127
 This restructuring reduced American Media‘s debt ―from 
$1.1 billion to $825 million,‖ and distributed approximately 70 percent of 
its common stock to Angelo Gordon, Avenue Capital, Capital Research & 
 
 
 123. ANGELO, GORDON & CO., http://www.angelogordon.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) 
(―Angelo, Gordon & Co. is a privately-held registered investment advisor dedicated to alternative 
investing. The firm was founded in 1988 and currently manages approximately $23 billion. We seek to 
generate absolute returns with low volatility by exploiting inefficiencies in selected markets and 
capitalizing on situations that are not in the mainstream of investment opportunities. We creatively 
seek out new opportunities that allow us to remain a leader in alternative investments.‖). 
 124. See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, National Enquirer Publisher Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS, 
Nov. 17, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/17/us-americanmedia-bankruptcy-
idUSTRE6AG42G20101117 (identifying publications housed at American Media).  
 125. See The Ur-Text of a Tabloid Age, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 2008, at 40, available at http:// 
www.newsweek.com/2008/09/20/the-ur-text-of-a-tabloid-age.html (explaining American Media‘s 
challenges and observing that ―[t]he Internet, the ideal medium for salacious, unconfirmed gossip, has 
been eating away at the tabloid‘s circulation for years‖). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Form 8-K from Am. Media Operations, Inc., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, File No. 
001-11112 (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/853927/000119 
312509020116/d8k.htm (―On January 30, 2009, American Media Operations, Inc. . . . successfully 
completed its cash tender offers . . . and receipt of requisite consents in the related consent solicitations 
. . . in respect of its outstanding senior subordinated notes . . . .‖). 
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Management Co., and Credit Suisse Securities.
128
 These investors also 
continued to hold approximately 78 percent of the company‘s 
subordinated bond debt. 
American Media‘s out-of-court debt reduction, however, proved 
inadequate, and in July 2010 the company announced that it intended to 
file a prepackaged plan of reorganization involving another debt-for-equity 
exchange.
129
 It completed solicitation of its prepackaged plan and filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case on November 17, 2010.
130
 Under the plan, 
American Media exchanged its senior subordinated notes for 
approximately 98 percent of its new common stock, providing those 
bondholders a return of approximately 53.5 percent.
131
 Angelo Gordon, 
Avenue Capital, Capital Research, and Credit Suisse received 79 percent 
of American Media‘s common stock under the plan of reorganization.  
The bankruptcy court approved American Media‘s plan on December 
20, 2010.
132
 The plan contemplates $565 million of new financing, but 
focuses primarily on the company‘s capital structure.133 It provides little 
insight regarding the company‘s business model or future plans.  
2. Freedom Communications, Inc. and the “Star Tribune” 
Freedom Communications, Inc. is the parent company of the Orange 
County Register in Irvine, Calif., and several other print publications.
134
 
Freedom operated as a privately held, family owned company for seventy-
five years.
135
 It began experiencing liquidity issues in 2004, not only due 
 
 
 128. Russell Adams & Mike Spector, Enquirer‘s Parent Plans Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704141104575588103839594996.html; see also 
Disclosure Statement Relating to the Debtors‘ Joint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 55, In re Am. Media, Inc., No. 10-16140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
30, 2010). 
 129. See Adams & Spector, supra note 128. 
 130. Press Release, Am. Media, Inc., American Media, Inc. Advances to Next Stage of Financial 
Restructuring (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.americanmediainc.com/press-releases/ 
american-media-inc-advances-next-stage-financial-restructuring.  
 131. See Donald Jeffrey, National Enquirer Publisher American Media‟s Bankruptcy Plan Wins 
Approval, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 20, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-20/ 
american-media-chapter-11-exit-plan-approved-in-n-y-bankruptcy-court.html.  
 132. See id. 
 133. See, e.g., Nat‘l Enquirer Owner Slated to Exit Bankruptcy, ABCNEWS.COM (Dec. 20, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12444647.  
 134. See Mary Ann Milbourn, Freedom Communications Exits Bankruptcy, ORANGE COUNTY 
REG.COM (Calif.), Apr. 30, 2010, http://ocbiz.ocregister.com/2010/04/30/freedom-communications-
exits-bankruptcy/18389/.  
 135. See id. (―Freedom‘s founding Hoiles family will no longer have an interest in the company, 
ending more than 75 years of ownership that started with Raymond Cyrus ‗R.C.‘ Hoiles, who 
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to the changing media environment, but also as the result of a company 
borrowing $1 billion to cash out some of the existing owners.
136
 It filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in September 2009. 
Under Freedom‘s plan of reorganization, the company exchanged $450 
million in debt for new common stock, which gave control of the 
reorganized company to Angelo Gordon, Alden Global Capital, Luxor 
Capital Group, and a group of lenders led by J.P. Morgan.
137
 These 
investors installed a new board of directors, and Freedom subsequently 
announced that it was seeking to sell parts of the company.
138
 
Commentators suggest that the dispositions are designed to allow Freedom 
to focus on the Orange County Register and perhaps consolidate it with 
the Los Angeles Times.
139
 
The Star Tribune is based in Minneapolis, Minn., and, based on 
circulation, is one of the largest newspapers in the United States.
140
 Similar 
to Freedom and the Tribune Co., discussed below, the Star Tribune 
experienced a change of control through a leveraged buyout shortly before 
its bankruptcy filing. Specifically, ―Avista Capital Partners[] bought the 
paper for $530 million,‖ $430 million of which was financed.141 This $430 
million of new debt eventually was converted into common stock under 
the Star Tribune‘s plan of reorganization, giving Angelo Gordon, Wayzata 
Investment Partners, Credit Suisse Group, and other investors control of 
the company.
142
 
 
 
purchased the Register in 1935 as a platform for his libertarian views on individual freedom and 
limited government.‖). 
 136. See id. (―Freedom‘s financial woes date back to 2004 when the company borrowed $1 billion 
to buy out family members who wanted to cash in their shares and to cover $332 million in existing 
debt and the deal‘s transaction costs.‖). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id.; see also Jerry Sullivan, Register Owner Freedom Said to Be Looking at Selling Parts 
of Company, ORANGE COUNTY BUS. J., Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.ocbj.com/news/2010/nov/19/ 
register-owner-freedom-said-be-looking-selling-par/.  
 139. See Sullivan, supra note 138.  
 140. See David Phelps, Star Tribune Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), 
Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/business/37685134.html.  
 141. See Phelps, supra note 140; see also David Phelps, Star Tribune‘s Largest Lender Is Local, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/business/37749999.html.  
 142. See Jennifer Bjorhus, New Board of Directors Proposed for Star Tribune, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Minn.), Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/local/56275087.html. Unlike American Media 
and Freedom, the Star Tribune also used its Chapter 11 case to modify certain contracts, including its 
union agreements. See New Owners for Star Tribune Reorganize, USA TODAY, June 19, 2009, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-06-19-star-tribune_N.htm.  
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3. Tribune Co. 
The Tribune Co. ―is a leading media and entertainment company 
reaching more than eighty percent (80%) of households in the United 
States through its newspaper, other publications and websites, its 
television and radio stations . . . and its other news and entertainment 
offerings.‖143 Its newspaper holdings include the Chicago Tribune, the Los 
Angeles Times, and the Baltimore Sun.
144
 The company filed a Chapter 11 
case in December 2008, approximately one year after going private 
through a leveraged buyout that saddled the company with additional 
debt.
145
 
At the time Tribune Co. filed bankruptcy, Angelo Gordon was the 
company‘s third largest creditor, holding $324 million of the company‘s 
prepetition debt.
146
 Based on the company‘s balance sheet, this 
investment—like those in American Media, Freedom, and Star Tribune—
appeared to give Angelo Gordon the company‘s fulcrum security that 
would be converted into equity through the Chapter 11 plan. The 
reorganization, however, has been consumed with litigation concerning 
the prepetition leveraged buyout and which tranche of debt should receive 
control under the plan of reorganization.
147
 
The litigation in Tribune Co.‘s Chapter 11 case illustrates a control 
contest among debtholders that is becoming more commonplace as 
investors invoke debt-based takeover strategies.
148
 Four different 
debtholder groups have proposed a plan of reorganization for the 
 
 
 143. See Joint Disclosure Statement for [Multiple] Plans of Reorganization at 7, In re Tribune Co., 
No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Joint Disclosure Statement]. 
 144. See id. at 8–12. 
 145. See Sarah Rabil, Tribune Bankruptcy „Stops Clocks,‟ Eases Debt Burden, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 
9, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNnMpms 
UNMxQ; Bill Rochelle, Tribune, Madoff Trustee, Innkeepers, WaMu, Chemtura, Ambac: Bankruptcy, 
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 11, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-11/tribune-
madoff-innkeepers-wamu-chemtura-ambac-bankruptcy.html (―Tribune withdrew a prior version of a 
reorganization in August in the wake of the examiner‘s report finding a likelihood the second phase of 
the leveraged buyout in December 2007 could be attacked successfully as a constructively fraudulent 
transfer.‖). 
 146. See Rochelle, supra note 145. 
 147. For a summary of some of the litigation relating to the Chapter 11 case, see Steven Church, 
Tribune Lawsuit Deadline Passes as Bankruptcy Plods On, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-09/tribune-lawsuit-deadline-passes-as-bankruptcy-plods-
on.html.  
 148. See supra Part II; see also Notice of Filing of Responsive Statement by Aurelius Capital 
Management et al., In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 23, 2010) (providing an 
example of the discourse among competing creditor groups in the Tribune Co. Chapter 11 case). 
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company.
149
 Each plan proposes a different capital structure for the 
reorganized company. 
Angelo Gordon is aligned with the company, the creditors‘ committee, 
Oaktree, and JPMorgan Chase Bank in the plan of reorganization 
dispute.
150
 Under the company‘s plan, Angelo Gordon, Oaktree, and a 
group of lenders led by JPMorgan Chase would receive control of the 
reorganized company, while wiping out a significant portion of the 
company‘s other prepetition secured and subordinated debt and proposing 
to pay general unsecured creditors‘ claims in full.151 The plan is opposed 
by numerous constituents, including unsecured creditors—who suggest the 
100 percent payment is illusory—and bondholders seeking percentage 
ownership of the reorganized company.
152
 
4. Philadelphia Newspapers 
In February 2009, Philadelphia Newspapers, which owns the 
Philadelphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia Daily News, filed a Chapter 11 
case.
153
 The company‘s initial plan of reorganization contemplated a sale 
of substantially all of the company‘s assets to a local group of investors.154 
Although the sale process included a public auction, it prohibited the use 
of credit bidding as part of a bidder‘s consideration. The restriction was 
designed to discourage bids from the company‘s existing debtholders, 
which included Angelo Gordon and Alden Global Capital.
155
 Whereas 
 
 
 149. See Joint Disclosure Statement, supra note 143, at 1. 
 150. See Specific Disclosure Statement Relating to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization 
for Tribune Co. & Its Subsidiaries, In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 8, 2010). 
 151. See id. at 6–10. 
 152. The bondholder group opposing Tribune Co.‘s proposed plan is led by Aurelius Capital 
Management. The bondholder plan proposes a seven-member board of directors for the reorganized 
company comprised of the Chief Executive Officer, four members selected by prepetition senior 
lenders and two members selected by Aurelius. See Specific Disclosure Statement for the Joint Plan of 
Reorganization for Tribune Co. & Its Subsidiaries Proposed by Aurelius Capital Management, et al., 
In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 9, 2010); see also The Ad Hoc Committee of 
Tribune Subsidiary Trade Creditors‘ Objection to the Proposed Specific Disclosure Statements 
Relating to the Plans of Reorganization at 2, In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 18, 
2010) (―Given the size of the claims pool and the fact that the Plan proponents felt it necessary to 
impose a ‗cap‘ on the amounts payable on account of the Trade Creditors‘ claims, the anticipated 
‗100%‘ cash recovery to Trade Creditors may be illusory.‖). 
 153. See Harold Brubaker & Chris Mondics, Inquirer‘s Owner Begins Court Odyssey, 
PHILLY.COM (Feb. 24, 2009), http://articles.philly.com/2009-02-24/news/24984626_1_toll-bros-bruce-
toll-investors.  
 154. See Rachel Feintzeig, Judge Signs Off on Philadelphia Newspapers‟ Bankruptcy Plan, WALL 
ST. J., June 28, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039641045753352606007234 
00.html (explaining history of case). 
 155. See Feintzeig, supra note 154 (―[T]he media company . . . blazed a new path to confirmation, 
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Tribune Co. illustrates a control contest among debtholders, Philadelphia 
Newspapers shows signs of a control contest between management (or a 
management-backed group of investors) and debtholders. 
The debtholders challenged the bidding restriction, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the 
company.
156
 Nevertheless, the debtholders participated in the auction with 
a non-credit bid and, in September 2010, ultimately prevailed with the 
highest and best offer.
157
 The debtholders have installed a new board of 
directors, and the company is focusing on integrating its operations and 
strengthening its digital platform.
158
  
5. The Makings of a Media Conglomerate 
Common themes run through the debt-based takeovers of American 
Media, Freedom, Star Tribune, Tribune Co., and Philadelphia 
Newspapers. They involve financially strapped companies with strong 
platforms and long histories in the newspaper industry, bargain acquisition 
prices, potential geographic and technology synergies, and management 
with few viable options. These companies potentially represent a cohesive 
media portfolio, which likely explains the repeat players in these deals, 
including Angelo Gordon.
159
 
But what do these and similar debt-based takeovers mean for the 
companies themselves and the stakeholders left behind? These and related 
questions are addressed in the following Part. Part IV then considers the 
need for, and substance of, any regulatory responses to the growing 
practice of debt-based takeovers. 
 
 
seeking to fold its sale into the plan of reorganization and block its lenders from bidding their debt in 
exchange for the assets.‖). 
 156. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 157. See Theresa McCabe, Lenders Win Phila. Newspaper Auction, THE STREET.COM (Sept. 24, 
2010, 1:50 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10861819/philadelphia-newspapers-up-for-auction. 
html (explaining the sale process, which included two separate auctions, both won by the debtholder 
group). 
 158. See Christopher K. Hepp, New Owners Take Control of Inquirer, Daily News, and 
Philly.com, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.philly.com/inquirer/breaking/business_breaking/ 
20101008_New_owners_take_control_of_Inquirer__Daily_News_and_Philly_com.html (explaining 
the post-sale changes implemented by the debtholder group). 
 159. See, e.g., Murray Coleman, Distressed Investor Grabs Stake in Register Parent, ORANGE 
COUNTY BUS. J., Apr. 4, 2010, http://www.ocbj.com/news/2010/apr/04/distressed-investor-grabs-
stake-register-parent/ (―‗The company‘s prospects are vastly underappreciated . . . . The hunger for 
information and entertainment hasn‘t gone away.‘‖ (quoting former chief executive officer of Freedom 
Communications)); Bjorhus, supra note 142 (―‗I think we could use more strengths in social 
networking and online community experience.‘‖ (quoting representative of Angelo Gordon regarding 
Star Tribune)). 
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B. Observations Regarding Loan-to-Own Strategies 
As illustrated by the activity in the newspaper industry, investors may 
employ debt-based takeovers not only to increase the return on their 
investment, but also to enhance their existing portfolio by combining 
companies with similar platforms or quieting the competition.
160
 These 
investors may have the expertise or the resources to improve the target 
company‘s performance, thereby saving or perhaps even creating jobs and 
increasing enterprise value.
161
 That value, however, typically is realized 
only in the future and captured largely or even exclusively by the 
distressed-debt investors themselves.  
One very real problem with debt-based takeovers concerns the 
treatment of the company‘s pre-takeover stakeholders.162 These 
stakeholders may include creditors junior to the distressed-debt investor, 
shareholders, or even employees, depending on whether the investor 
continues the business, consolidates, or sells operations.
163
 Although junior 
 
 
 160. See supra Part III.A. 
 161. See GILSON & ALTMAN, supra note 50, at 23–26 (discussing cases involving distressed-debt 
investors and positing that ―the investor‘s ultimate goal is to create value by causing the firm‘s assets 
to be managed more productively, whether this involves taking a direct management role in the firm, 
effecting management change through control of the reorganization process, exercising control over 
the firm as a significant owner, or acquiring specific assets from the firm and redeploying them.‖); Kai 
Li et al., Hedge Funds in Chapter 11, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 215–16, 22), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1493966 (empirical study presenting data 
suggesting, among other things, ―efficiency gains brought by hedge funds [and their activity in 
Chapter 11] rather than value extraction from other claims‖); see also Eisenberg, supra note 55 
(discussing potential benefits to hedge fund activity in distressed debt); Thomas More Griffin, 
Financing Available in Distressed Markets: Alternatives When Bank or Government Bail Out Funds 
Are Not Available, GIBBONS P.C. (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.gibbonslaw.com/news_publications/ 
articles.php?action=display_publication&publication_id=2732 (explaining the value in certain 
financing structures involving distressed-debt investors as the distressed company‘s only or limited 
financing alternatives).  
 162. See, e.g., Hotchkiss et al., supra note 21, at 11–12 (explaining conflict that typically exists 
and motivates decision among various stakeholders, and noting that ―[s]enior creditors that are first in 
line may prefer an inefficient liquidation that converts the firm‘s assets into cash and provides senior 
debtholders with a safe distribution[; i]n contrast, junior creditors or out-of-the-money shareholders 
may prefer inefficient continuation because it has a potential upside‖); Strom, supra note 20 
(explaining tactics by investors for gaining control of distressed companies and explaining how 
strategies like arbitrage may depress value for lower tranches of debt); Tiffany Kary, Blockbuster 
Bondholders Bet Company Will Go Out of Business, BLOOMBERG, May 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-07/blockbuster-bondholders-betting-company-will-collapse-
update1-.html (―[A]s many as 25 hedge funds have taken positions that would benefit them if junior 
notes decline in value.‖ (reporting statement of analyst)). 
 163. See, e.g., MOYER, supra note 114, at 352 (―[A strategy post-reorganization control] could 
drive an investor with sufficient negotiating leverage to insist on a plan that allocates recoveries to 
other creditors in the form of debt, so that the control investor‘s class retains the equity.‖); Strom, 
supra note 20 (noting that distressed-debt investors often seek to terminate pension fund obligations 
and work to structure post-reorganization mergers and consolidations as exit strategies). For example, 
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stakeholders and employees often are adversely affected by a 
restructuring, the risk may increase in the loan-to-own context.  
A loan-to-own strategy is successful if the investor accurately predicts 
and purchases the tranche of debt that constitutes the company‘s fulcrum 
security.
164
 This requires a difficult, sometimes subjective valuation of the 
company. Once an investor makes this calculation, it has a vested interest 
in that valuation being adopted by the company and others in the 
reorganization. That valuation is the means by which the investor acquires 
the company‘s stock and extinguishes the rights of all junior 
stakeholders.
165
 
The question then becomes whether the valuation is a fair 
representation or a depressed value that benefits the distressed-debt 
investor.
166
 A distressed-debt investor may intentionally or unintentionally 
depress value. For example, if the investor is encouraging a debt-for-
equity exchange, the company‘s value likely will be determined by expert 
appraisals. These appraisals often are subject to different methodologies, 
opinions, and disputes.
167
 Alternatively, if the investor is purchasing the 
company‘s assets, the investor‘s credit bid may chill the bidding process.  
 
 
many expect consolidation and resulting layoffs in connection with the distressed-debt investor 
activity in the newspaper industry. See, e.g., Milbourn, supra note 134 (―[T]he newspaper landscape is 
likely to change, with an increase in mergers and consolidations and accompanying layoffs.‖ (quoting 
industry consultant)); Judge Oks $139M of Court Sale of Philly Newspapers, CBSPHILLY.COM (Sept. 
30, 2010), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2010/09/30/judge-oks-139m-court-sale-of-philly-news papers/ 
(―[C]reditors plan to cut costs by 13 percent across the board [and n]ewsroom employees have agreed 
to 6 percent pay cuts that include two-week furloughs, but will be spared layoffs for at least a year.‖).  
 164. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text; see also Hotchkiss et al., supra note 21, at 26 
(discussing role of fulcrum security in debt-based changes of control); Kai Li et al., supra note 161, at 
15–16, 22 (same). 
 165. See, e.g., Tiffany Kary, Bankruptcy Turnarounds Menaced by Investor Valuation Fights, 
Lifland Says, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 20, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-
20/bankruptcy-turnarounds-menaced-by-investor-valuation-fights-lifland-says.html (explaining perils 
of valuation fights among stakeholders in Chapter 11 and noting that ―[c]ompanies trying to 
rehabilitate themselves through bankruptcy are threatened by valuation fights among late-arriving 
investors‖); see also David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy 
Valuation, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 64 (1991) (positing that bankruptcy courts‘ valuations are based on 
―subjunctive facts—facts that can be assessed only contingently in the context of a highly hypothetical 
universe which can never be‖); Stuart C. Gilson et al., Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, J. CORP. 
RENEWAL (July 1, 2000), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=1292 
(―Valuation errors in Chapter 11 have significant wealth consequences. Underestimating value benefits 
claimants and managers who receive shares or stock options in the reorganization.‖). For an interesting 
empirical analysis of the role of bankruptcy judges in valuation disputes, see Keith Sharfman, Judicial 
Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387 (2005). 
 166. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Berstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, 
and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1952–60 (2004) (explaining various methods of 
valuation in the Chapter 11 context and subjectivity and uncertainty associated with those methods); 
see also MOYER, supra note 114, at 264–66 (discussing challenges in bankruptcy valuations). 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 1953 (noting that resolution of valuation disputes in Chapter 11 often ―‗splits 
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In addition, the distressed-debt investor‘s proposed uses of the 
company‘s assets arguably may divert value from junior stakeholders.168 
In the Tribune Co. cases, the plan proposed by the company and the 
Angelo Gordon group included releases of the company‘s claims and 
causes of action against certain parties.
169
 Chapter 11 plans frequently 
provide releases to plan proponents and other parties. Nevertheless, parties 
opposing the Tribune Co.‘s plan argued that the proposed releases 
undervalue the claims—value that otherwise might have flowed to junior 
stakeholders.
170
  
It is difficult to assess the valuation arguments surrounding debt-based 
takeovers with any certainty.
171
 The resolution may depend on who does 
the analysis and how it is performed.
172
 Given this uncertainty, Part IV 
proposes a process for providing more information and signaling 
opportunities to parties involved in these transactions. The proposal seeks 
to help those closest to, and most affected by, debt-based takeovers make 
better informed decisions and better protect their interests. It strives to 
strike an appropriate balance that permits value-enhancing takeovers while 
protecting the interests of the company‘s other stakeholders.173  
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATION OF 
DEBT-BASED TAKEOVERS 
As discussed above, investors use both equity-based and debt-based 
takeovers to achieve similar objectives.
174
 Moreover, as explained in Parts 
 
 
the baby‘ based on the judge‘s determination of value, which may depart from what either the senior 
investor or the junior investor thinks the business is worth‖). 
 168. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra Part III.A. 
 170. See, e.g., Randall Chase, Tribune Judge Weighs Competing Plans, ABCNEWS.COM (Nov. 29, 
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12268396 (explaining the releases of liability 
contained in the plan of reorganization submitted by Tribune Co. and others and noting that ―[c]ritics 
of Tribune‘s plan argue that the holders of senior loan debt from the disastrous buyout are getting off 
too easily‖). 
 171. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 173. That balance in turn serves the dual goals of debtor rehabilitation and creditor return 
maximization underlying Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 
(1977) (―The purpose of a business reorganization case [under Chapter 11] . . . is to restructure a 
business‘s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its 
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders.‖); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978) (same); Toibb 
v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991) (same); see also Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking 
in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993) (discussing multiple goals framing provisions of 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 174. See supra Parts II, III. 
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II and III, both strategies pose potential risk to the target company and its 
stakeholders. Yet, applicable regulations treat the two strategies very 
differently.  
This Part synthesizes the discussion in Parts II and III and proposes a 
regulatory framework for debt-based takeovers. It suggests a disclosure 
scheme similar to section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act for 
acquisitions of a company‘s long-term debt.175 These disclosures would 
provide the company and its stakeholders with valuable information prior 
to filing for bankruptcy, which could change or improve a company‘s 
restructuring plans and thereby preserve or create more value.
176
 They also 
would complement and enhance the information provided to parties in the 
bankruptcy context. Notably, the proposal does not include any provision 
directly governing tender offers or exchanges involving debt securities, as 
those types of transactions are generally governed in varying degrees by 
section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, the Trust Indenture Act, and 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
177
  
The following discussion explains the intricacies of the proposed 
disclosure rules and their interaction with the Securities Exchange Act, the 
Trust Indenture Act, and the Bankruptcy Code. It also considers 
 
 
 175. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 176. See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (discussing the disadvantages created by information 
asymmetries in the negotiation context). Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a plan 
proponent to provide certain information relevant to the plan of reorganization to parties entitled to 
vote on the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). This provision was intended to facilitate information 
sharing between the parties negotiating the plan and stakeholders who were not involved in that 
process. See RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE § 11.01, at 11–3 (1986) (explaining the legislative history to section 1125 and noting that ―it was 
thought that the failure of the parties intimately involved in the bankruptcy proceeding to supply 
adequate information to the constituencies which would be called on to vote on a plan was a matter 
calling for immediate and substantial reform‖). As discussed supra Part III, information asymmetry 
may affect leverage among parties at the negotiating table as well. The proposed regulation discussed 
in Part IV seeks to remedy this inadequacy, which also will benefit the Chapter 11 process and 
enhance the disclosures required by section 1125. 
 177. For example, ―[s]ection 14(e) and Regulation 14E apply to tender offers for any type of 
security (including debt). These provisions apply both to registered and unregistered securities 
(including securities issued by a private company), except exempt securities under the Exchange Act, 
such as municipal bonds.‖ U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Release No. 34-43069, Commission Guidance 
on Mini-Tender Offers and Limited Partnership Tender Offers, ¶ I.C. (July 31, 2000), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-43069.htm. Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act protects a 
bondholder‘s right to payment of principal and interest from modification without its consent. See, 
e.g., George W. Schuster, Jr., The Trust Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 431–32 (2006). Moreover, sections 1125, 1126 and 1129 of the Bankruptcy 
Code govern the solicitation of votes on, and confirmation of, any plan of reorganization, including 
those that contemplate a debt-for-equity or other change-of-control transaction. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125–26, 
1129 (2006).  
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alternatives to, and potential critiques of, the proposal.
178
 This Part 
concludes by highlighting the competing interests and policies at stake and 
the strong justifications for using disclosure to achieve an appropriate 
balance.  
A. Disclosure of Debt Acquisitions 
The Securities Exchange Act requires investors to file a report with the 
SEC once they acquire, directly or indirectly, five percent or more of the 
beneficial interests in a company‘s equity securities.179 Although there are 
certain types of debt that constitute ―securities‖ under the Securities 
Exchange Act,
180
 they are not equity securities and do not trigger any type 
of reporting obligation.
181
 In addition, certain types of debt are not 
considered securities at all.
182
 Regardless of whether a debt holding 
constitutes a security, debt purchasers generally have no obligation to 
report their acquisitions to the debtor company.  
The lack of disclosure obligations for debt purchasers provides them 
with a strategic advantage, particularly if they desire to influence corporate 
affairs or take over control of the company.
183
 These debt purchasers can 
quietly accumulate large holdings in a company‘s debt that provide them 
with substantial advantages in any subsequent restructuring.
184
 This lack of 
disclosure also significantly increases existing information asymmetry in 
restructuring negotiations.
185
 The company or other stakeholders could 
 
 
 178. See infra Part IV.D. 
 179. See supra Part II.B.1; see also GAUGHAN, supra note 71, at 71–73 (explaining requirements 
of section 13(d)). 
 180. The definition of ―security‖ under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act includes notes, bonds, 
and debentures. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 881, 883 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006)). 
 181. Section 13(d) applies only to ―equity securities.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006); see also supra 
Part II.B.1; Lipson, supra note 17, at 1630 (―[Rule 13d-1] does not apply to ‗straight‘ debt 
securities.‖). 
 182. For example, credit facilities and syndicated loans generally are not considered securities 
under section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act., ch. 404, § 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 881, 883 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006)). 
 183. See supra Part I. 
 184. See supra Part III.A. 
 185. See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 17, at 1651–53 (discussing the costs of information asymmetry 
in restructuring negotiations and noting that such ―[s]hadow bankruptcy obscures these incentives, and 
thus makes negotiation more uncertain and expensive‖); see also Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-
Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 1996) (―[The] disclosure requirements are crucial to 
the effective functioning of the federal bankruptcy system. Because creditors and the bankruptcy court 
rely heavily on the debtor‘s disclosure statement in determining whether to approve a proposed 
reorganization plan, the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be overstated.‖). ―Information 
asymmetry can occur when one market participant has more or better information than another market 
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make different or more timely, proactive decisions regarding a financial 
restructuring if afforded more complete information.  
To help mitigate these circumstances, Congress should amend section 
13 of the Securities Exchange Act to include reporting obligations for debt 
purchasers.
186
 These reporting obligations should include the following 
elements: 
 A comprehensive definition of ―long-term debt‖ that includes 
not only debt securities, but also any debt qualifying as ―long-
term debt obligations‖ under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and disclosure requirements for 
Management‘s Discussion and Analysis under section 13 of 
the Securities Exchange Act.
187
  
 A reporting requirement for any person that acquires, directly 
or indirectly, a beneficial ownership interest in a company‘s 
long-term debt that constitutes fifteen percent (15%) or more 
of any single long-term debt obligation or twenty percent 
(20%) or more of the company‘s aggregate long-term debt 
obligations.
188
  
 
 
participant.‖ Eleonora Zlotnikova, The Global Dilemma in Short Selling Regulation: IOSCO‟s 
Information Disclosure Proposals and the Potential for Regulatory Arbitrage, 35 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 
965, 977 (2010). 
 186. The Article refers to these amendments as the proposed regulation. The proposed regulation 
would apply to all companies required to file quarterly and annual reports with the SEC, and is not 
dependent on the financial condition of a company. Limiting the disclosure requirements to the 
distressed context would limit the utility of the proposal because it unnecessarily restricts response 
time for the company and other stakeholders and the value of signaling. The underlying policy is to 
acknowledge the similarities between equity and debt in the takeover context and provide similar 
regulation for both. In these and other respects, the substance of the proposed regulation differs 
significantly from the positional disclosure suggested by Professor Lipson in the context of ―shadow 
bankruptcy.‖ See Lipson, supra note 17, at 1614–15, 1669–70 (discussing the unregulated 
environment that allows private investors to influence distressed companies and the need for additional 
transparency). 
 187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(5)(ii)(A) (2010) (Item 303(a)(5)(ii) of 
Regulation S-K) (―Long-Term Debt Obligation means a payment obligation under long-term 
borrowings referenced in FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 47 Disclosure of 
Long-Term Obligations (March 1981), as may be modified or supplemented.‖). 
 188. The term ―beneficial ownership‖ would be defined under Rule 13d-3, which includes 
ownership by  
any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, 
relationship, or otherwise has or shares: (1) [v]oting power which includes the power to vote, 
or to direct the voting of, such security; and/or, (2) [i]nvestment power which includes the 
power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)(1)-(2) (2010). 
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 The required report should include, at a minimum, the 
beneficial owner‘s name; the purchaser‘s name (if different 
from the beneficial owner); the type of debt purchased; the 
amount of each type of debt owned by the beneficial owner as 
of the date of the report; and whether the beneficial owner 
owns or holds the economic rights, voting rights (as granted 
by the applicable debt instrument or applicable law), or both 
with respect to each type of debt.
189
  
 The required report should be filed within seven days of the 
purchase that triggers the reporting obligation, unless at the 
end of that seven-day period, the beneficial owner no longer 
owns, directly or indirectly, an interest in the company‘s long-
term debt that constitutes fifteen percent (15%) or more of any 
single long-term debt obligation or twenty percent (20%) or 
more of the company‘s aggregate long-term debt 
obligations.
190
  
 The report should be filed with the SEC and served on the 
company and any indenture trustee or agent associated with 
the subject debt instruments.
191
  
Although these reporting obligations resemble the requirements for 
equity securities under section 13(d), there are four important 
 
 
 189. These disclosures would track Items 1, 2, 5 and 6 on Schedule 13G. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 
(2010). They are intended, among other things, to mitigate the practice of empty voting where an 
investor severs the voting rights from the economic rights associated with the debt instrument or 
security. The lack of economic consequences to an investor holding only voting rights raises concern 
regarding motivation and arbitrage plays. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt 
Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008); see also 
Lipson, supra note 17, at 1648–49; Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 
11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 427–29 (2007).  
 190. The proposed regulation generally is not intended to capture traders who buy and sell the 
debt quickly. See Harner, supra note 3, at 112–16 (describing different types of distressed-debt 
investors and explaining strategies and motivations of traders). Notably, the proposed regulation may 
apply to investors intending to profit by trading or flipping the debt, but who are holding the debt 
pending resolution of any restructuring. Nevertheless, disclosures would be required only if the 
investor accumulated debt above the threshold amounts. In those instances, even if the investor is not 
vying for control, its significant debt ownership may provide it with significant leverage in any 
restructuring negotiations. The proposed seven-day grace period strikes an appropriate balance 
between these competing interests. Cf. Wachtell et al., supra note 95 (proposing a shorter grace period 
in the equity-based takeover context). 
 191. As discussed infra Part IV.C, the proposed regulation would continue to apply after any 
bankruptcy filing. In those cases, filing with the bankruptcy court also may be appropriate and would 
further serve the goals of addressing information asymmetry and providing signaling in the corporate 
reorganization context. 
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differences.
192
 First, the type of debt governed by the provision extends 
beyond the definition of securities.
193
 The proposed regulation could be 
limited to debt securities, but that approach would exclude a large portion 
of debt typically included in a company‘s capital structure and limit the 
utility of the regulation.
194
 The broader application is necessary to protect 
the filing company and the holders of that company‘s securities. This core 
purpose underlying the regulation is consistent with the SEC‘s general 
mission.
195
 
Second, the trigger thresholds differ based on whether the purchaser is 
accumulating debt within a single tranche or across the company‘s capital 
structure. The higher percentage for the latter type of acquisition pattern 
reflects the fact that, to have meaningful influence within each purchased 
tranche of debt, the investor must have greater overall ownership.
196
 
 
 
 192. Given the potential for an investor to acquire both equity and debt in the same company, a 
joint disclosure form that discloses both types of holdings when an investor‘s purchases exceed either 
the equity or the debt threshold might be warranted. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 193. The scope of ―long-term debt‖ for purposes of the proposed disclosures would be broader 
than the definition of debt securities for other purposes under the securities laws. This broader 
definition is warranted to prevent manipulation of a company‘s capital structure to avoid the mandated 
disclosures. This Article does not propose extending the use of the long-term debt concept beyond this 
limited purpose. 
 194. Secondary trading markets exist not only for notes, debts, and debentures, but also for a 
company‘s other long-term obligations. See Harner, supra note 3, at 710–12 (describing types of debt 
trading on secondary markets). 
 195. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, The Investor‟s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. 
shtml (last modified Feb. 1, 2011) (―The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is 
to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.‖). 
The SEC has expressed support for enhanced disclosures in the U.S. debt markets. See, e.g., The Bond 
Price Competition Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Finance & 
Hazardous Materials, 106 Cong. 9–11 (1999) (executive summary of statement of Hon. Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Comm‘n), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
testarchive/1999/tsty0499.htm (―The Commission has long believed that transparency promotes the 
fairness and efficiency of the U.S. capital markets and fosters investor confidence in those markets. 
This is as true for debt markets as for equity markets.‖). Any amendment to section 13(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act incorporating the proposed regulation should expressly grant the SEC 
authority to propose and implement disclosure rules relating to long-term debt obligations given the 
relevance of trading in the secondary markets for long-term debt to interstate commerce, issuers, and 
holders of securities. ―Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934 to 
enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote stability in the markets and, most importantly, to 
protect investors.‖ U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Creation of the SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last modified Feb. 20, 2011). Notably, the proposed regulation targets the same 
concerns as the Securities Exchange Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (―No investor . . . 
can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming 
his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. . . . [T]he hiding and secreting of 
important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value.‖). 
 196. For example, a class of claims is deemed to vote in favor of a Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization only if two-thirds in amount and one-half in number of holders vote in favor of the 
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006); see also Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 26, at 691 (positing 
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Moreover, although neither percentage reflects a true blocking position 
(typically at least one-third ownership), it suggests a commitment to the 
investment that may lead to greater future ownership.
197
  
Third, the proposed regulation maintains the concepts of direct and 
indirect purchases and beneficial ownership. As in the equity context, 
investors can use indirect means, as well as decoupling strategies, to 
purchase debt.
198
 Any regulation thus needs to try to close these gaps and 
require reporting in all potential acquisition scenarios. For this reason, the 
report itself mandates a disclosure of the types of interests owned or held 
by the beneficial owner.  
Finally, the proposed regulation incorporates the seven day grace 
period for filing a report found in section 13(d), but excludes investors 
who sell or divest a sufficient amount of debt within that seven days.
199
 
Alternatively, the exclusion could be applicable only if the investor sells 
or divests all long-term debt holdings on or before the seventh day. The 
less restrictive approach is proposed to minimize any disruption of trading 
related to the reporting obligation in secondary debt markets. 
B. Parameters of Disclosure Obligations 
The proposed disclosure regulation uses only a portion of the federal 
and state regulations applicable to equity-based takeovers.
200
 A more 
limited approach is warranted given other processes that govern debt 
exchanges and asset sales and the questionable utility of takeover 
 
 
hypothetical with four distressed-debt investors each holding twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
company‘s outstanding unsecured debt and explaining that ―[s]ection 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code 
allows any of the three to form a coalition in which they can cramdown a plan on the fourth‖); Ronald 
W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity 
and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 256 (2009) (discussing benefits to 
private debt versus public debt and noting that ―a debt violation in a public bond issue triggers the 
need to obtain the agreement of two-thirds of the bondholders to waive a violation, which can be both 
a difficult and a slow process‖). 
 197. Nevertheless, in the out-of-court restructuring context, a single bondholder may block 
modifications to the principal and interest due on the bonds, which may be necessary to facilitate any 
consensual restructuring. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the Trust Indenture 
Act).  
 198. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text. The language used to describe ―beneficial 
ownership‖ needs to consider and capture derivative instruments that permit the holder to influence or 
exercise control. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children‘s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK), 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 539–
40 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting potential limitations of ―beneficial ownership‖ definition in the equity-
based takeover context). 
 199. See supra note 189. 
 200. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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defenses, particularly in the debt context.
201
 Moreover, the proposed 
regulation does not suggest an option for qualifying the purchase as a 
passive investment. Unlike in the equity context, the rights associated with 
a debt instrument itself may facilitate the takeover opportunity without the 
investor necessarily launching a public takeover campaign.
202
  
Many of the regulations for tender offers found in section 14 are 
neither applicable nor necessary in the straight debt context.
203
 This 
section was designed, in part, to protect shareholders from unequal or 
unfair treatment in a tender offer.
204
 The Trust Indenture Act provides 
similar protection in bond exchanges. Furthermore, most debt-for-equity 
exchanges and asset sales proceed through the federal bankruptcy 
process.
205
 The Bankruptcy Code generally gives affected stakeholders the 
opportunity to vote on the proposed plan of reorganization or at least file 
objections to the plan or any asset sale.
206
  
Likewise, shareholders‘ rights plans, staggered boards, and other state 
law anti-takeover defenses appear mismatched with, or inapplicable to, 
debt-based takeovers.
207
 For example, a company in financial distress has 
likely triggered or is about to trigger cross-default provisions in all of its 
debt instruments, rendering meaningless debt acceleration provisions 
triggered by changes in control.
208
 Similarly, a company that restructures 
 
 
 201. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 202. For example, Rule 13d-1 explains that a person who is otherwise required to file a report 
under the rule may file a short-form statement on Schedule 13G if, among other things,  
[s]uch person has acquired such securities in the ordinary course of his business and not with 
the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer, nor in 
connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, including 
any transaction subject to Rule 13d-3(b) . . . . 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (2010). Schedule 13G, in turn, requires only minimal disclosures. 
Moreover, because simply holding a significant position in a distressed company‘s debt may give the 
investor leverage in any restructuring, the proposed regulation does not require a specific statement 
that the investor has purchased the debt in an effort to force a change of control. See Item 4, Schedule 
13G. The proposed regulation assumes this as a potential consequence of the debt ownership.  
 203. Nevertheless, section 14(e) does apply to debt securities. See supra note 177 and 
accompanying text. ―The net effect is that a tender offer for debt securities need only comply with the 
anti-fraud rules of section 14(e) and not with the more fulsome registration and disclosure rules of 
section 14(d).‖ Lipson, supra note 17, at 1631. 
 204. For example, section 14(d)(7) and Rule 14d-10 require all investors who tender shares to 
receive the same price and to have an opportunity to withdraw. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5), (7) (2006); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2010). 
 205. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.  
 206. Id. 
 207. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 208. See generally ALLISON TAYLOR & ALICIA SANSONE, THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN 
SYNDICATION AND TRADING 341–42 (2007) (explaining the meaning and consequences of cross-
default and cross-acceleration provisions in debt documents). 
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under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code can propose a completely new 
board of directors under its plan of reorganization, undercutting the utility 
of staggered boards.
209
 Moreover, given the potential value of debt-based 
takeovers, the proposed regulation does not seek to impose or endorse 
insurmountable barriers to such takeover activity.
210
  
C. Application in Bankruptcy 
A debtor in bankruptcy has extensive disclosure obligations.
211
 Those 
obligations generally do not apply, however, to creditors, shareholders, or 
other parties in interest. Rather, these parties typically are not required to 
make any disclosures until they file a proof of claim or interest, if 
required, or otherwise seek to be heard in the bankruptcy case.
212
 When 
disclosure is required, a general statement of the type of claim or interest 
held by the party often suffices. Consequently, much of the secrecy 
surrounding debtholders‘ activities outside of bankruptcy continues even 
during the bankruptcy case.
213
  
The proposed regulation would significantly help the flow of 
information and communication in Chapter 11 cases. Many investors 
 
 
 209. See, e.g., Hotchkiss et al., supra note 21, at 22–26 (discussing management turnover in 
context of Chapter 11 cases); Kai Li et al., supra note 161 (same). 
 210. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.  
 211. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 212. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006) (describing parties in interest that may be heard on issues 
raised in Chapter 11 cases); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (listing disclosures required by creditor or equity 
holder filing a proof of claim or interest in the Chapter 11 case).  
 213. The lack of transparency surrounding distressed debt investments not only is a problem in 
out-of-court workouts, but also in Chapter 11 cases. Bankruptcy rule 2019 requires ―every entity or 
committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder‖ to disclose certain 
information to the bankruptcy court. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a). This information concerns the names 
of the represented creditors or equity holders, the nature and amount of the claims or interests held by 
those parties and certain other information concerning the relationship among the parties. Id. Courts 
are split regarding the application of rule 2019 to creditors acting collectively through an ad hoc 
committee or single professional in the case, which typically includes distressed-debt investors. 
Compare In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 422 B.R. 553 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (Bankruptcy rule 2019 
does not apply) and In re Premier Int‘l Holding, Inc., 423 B.R. 58 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (same), with 
In re Wash. Mut. Inc., 419 B.R. 271 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (Bankruptcy rule 2019 does apply). 
Amendments to rule 2019 were proposed to increase the disclosures required by the rule and clarify 
the scope of its application. See Davis Polk & Wardwell, Insolvency and Restructuring Update: 
Standing Committee Approves Major Changes to Bankruptcy Disclosure Rule, DAVIS POLK CLIENT 
NEWSL. (June 16, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/ab3987a9-a349-451e-8495-bc78 
73da2789/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ed332081-c016-4b89-9071-bcf2f66c6f20/061610_ir_update 
.pdf. The U.S. Supreme Court approved the proposed amendments on April 26, 2011, and the 
amendments are expected to take effect on December 1, 2011. See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCloy LLP, U.S. Supreme Court Approves Proposed Amendment Expanding Disclosure 
Requirements Under Bankruptcy Rule 2019 (May 6, 2011), http://www.milbank.com/NR/rdonlyres/ 
B405D0F7-4F7D-4CFD-A17E-46620A8CC44E/0/Rule2019_FRGClient_Alert_05062011.pdf.  
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continue or start buying the company‘s debt after it files a bankruptcy 
case.
214
 The debt may be further discounted at that time, and holders may 
be more willing to sell to avoid the delay and uncertainty associated with 
the bankruptcy case. The Securities Exchange Act generally continues to 
govern Chapter 11 debtors that were subject to the Act prior to the 
bankruptcy filing.
215
 The proposed regulation should be no different, and 
debt purchasers should remain subject to its provisions throughout the 
Chapter 11 case.  
D. Potential Critiques 
The primary focus of the proposed regulation is more disclosure. 
Admittedly, disclosure alone will not completely mitigate the risks 
associated with debt-based takeovers.
216
 Investors will still be able to 
accumulate significant holdings of debt, which provide them a seat at the 
negotiating table and an opportunity to influence the outcome of those 
negotiations. Similarly, the proposed regulation does not give other 
stakeholders a seat at the table or any type of leverage over the process. 
Rather, it provides notice to the company and its stakeholders, allowing 
them to consider not only alternative restructuring options, but also ways 
to get other parties to the table or otherwise temper the potential influence 
of the distressed-debt investor.
217
 
 
 
 214. See generally Harner, supra note 3 (explaining the timing and discounts relevant to distressed 
debt investing decisions and providing four case studies to illustrate strategies). 
 215. For a discussion of SEC reporting obligations relating to bankruptcy filings, see David J. 
Barton, SEC Disclosure, Filing Requirements for Public Companies in Chapter 11, J. CORP. RENEWAL 
(Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=10450. 
 216. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713, 1743 (discussing role of disclosure in mitigating 
risks); Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 369–73 (2006) (same and discussing several studies suggesting value to 
mandatory disclosure schemes); Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure 
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123 (2004) (noting debate concerning 
value of disclosure schemes and transparency); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory 
Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2000) (―While there is an obvious 
information asymmetry between issuers and investors, ‗[o]ne must be careful to avoid the fallacy that 
if some information is good, more must be better.‘‖); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure 
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (discussing challenges to effective 
disclosure in increasingly complex financial markets). 
 217. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 431–32 (2003) (―People rarely want information for its 
own sake. Rather, people want information because it is empowering. Information enables those who 
have it to make informed decisions and to better protect their interests, whatever they may be. The 
federal securities laws are no different.‖); see also David W. Case, Corporate Environmental 
Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] ACTIVIST DISTRESSED DEBTHOLDERS 203 
 
 
 
 
Similar to the original purpose of the Williams Act, the proposed 
disclosures are designed to promote investor protections. They are not 
intended to prohibit or impede debt-based takeovers.
218
 Debt-based 
takeovers may in certain cases present the best price and utilty for the 
target company. Nevertheless, in other cases, they may undercut the value 
and sustainability of the company. Although investors dealing in the 
secondary debt markets may appreciate the risks associated with loan-to-
own investment techniques and may price that risk into the transaction, 
other stakeholders (including a company‘s shareholders and public 
bondholders) may not have the relevant information and may not 
otherwise be able to protect their interests without it.
219
 
For these reasons, the proposed disclosures are targeted and carefully 
crafted to balance the competing interests.
220
 A regulation that intruded 
further into the debt markets and attempted to govern the process or 
substance of debt-based control contests could actually make it more 
difficult for the distressed company to access additional liquidity or 
finance potential restructuring alternatives. Such a broad-based regulation 
could kill the business that it is trying so hard to protect.  
Though the proposed disclosures are purposefully targeted, some 
investors will nonetheless contend that they are far too intrusive. 
Distressed-debt investors typically are very protective of information 
concerning their holdings, arguing that such information reveals 
proprietary investment strategies.
221
 Notably, the proposed regulation does 
not require a disclosure of the price at which the investor purchased the 
 
 
431–32 (2005) (explaining in the environmental context how disclosure and transparency lead to 
―better-informed decision-making‖). 
 218. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 219. Investors also may argue that the proposed disclosures increase the costs of transactions and 
in turn will increase the cost of financing. That could in fact be the case, but any such increase should 
be minimal given the relative ease with which investors can electronically report the transactions they 
already monitor. In addition, that consideration should be offset by the enhanced protection for the 
investor community more generally. 
 220. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 196, at 256–57 (explaining competitive disadvantage to 
mandatory disclosures in certain contexts); Zlotnikova, supra note 185, at 987–88 (explaining costs to 
mandatory disclosure rules and noting that ―when establishing disclosure and reporting regimes, 
regulators should be clear about the objectives of such regulations‖). 
 221. See, e.g., Eric B. Fisher & Peter D. Morgenstern, Hedge Funds in Bankruptcy Court: Rule 
2019 and the Disclosure of Sensitive Claim Information, FIN. & BANKING COMM. (Am. Bankr. Inst., 
Alexandria, Va.), available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/financebank/vol4num 
2/2.pdf (discussing potential concerns with increased mandatory disclosures in the bankruptcy 
context); Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REGULATION (CATO Inst., 
Wash., D.C.), Spring 2010, at 36, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n1/v30n1-1. 
pdf (discussing concerns with general disclosures of investors equity positions and related 
information). 
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debt or any information about its other investments or portfolio 
companies.
222
 The required report mandates disclosure of only limited 
information that is necessary to protect the interests of the company and its 
stakeholders. Anything less would reduce the value of the report 
significantly and only alert the company to a potential problem without 
providing it with any information to formulate an appropriate response.
223
  
Finally, investors and commentators may suggest that this problem is 
best addressed by private contract.
224
 In theory, parties could negotiate 
these types of disclosure provisions as part of the original debt documents. 
In practice, however, it is very unlikely that the company would have 
sufficient leverage to prevail in that negotiation.
225
 Lenders and indenture 
trustees would have little incentive to agree to any provision that restricted 
their ability to sell their claims and likely would resist any such provision. 
Companies also would likely wait until a refinancing or forbearance 
negotiation to request the provision, thereby exacerbating the leverage 
problem. Although seeking these disclosures through private negotiation 
could work theoretically, that approach simply will not be feasible in most 
cases.
226
  
In fact, the proposed disclosures may facilitate more informed and 
complete contracting regarding the terms and consequences of transactions 
involving the company‘s debt. The disclosures would provide the 
company and its stakeholders with information concerning the company‘s 
 
 
 222. See supra Part IV.A. 
 223. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 
191–92 (2005) (explaining debate regarding the privatization of debtor-creditor laws); Susan Block-
Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy Law, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2000) (same); 
Bainbridge, supra note 216 (discussing privatization issues in corporate law context); Susanna Kim 
Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 197–98 (2006) (same). Moreover, the 
SEC is better suited than states or exchanges to oversee the proposed regulation, particularly in light of 
its relation to the market value of securities. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of 
Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT‘L L. 531, 534 (2001) 
(discussing general proposals to privatize securities regulation).  
 225. Several commentators have observed the increasing control of creditors over distressed 
companies in both out-of-court and in-court restructurings. This increased control often is achieved 
through covenants negotiated in debt instruments prior to any sign of financial trouble. See, e.g., 
Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 31 (empirical study documenting increasing creditor control and 
leverage over debtors); Douglas Baird & Robert Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, Reply, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 673, 675 (2003) (―Even in the cases most resembling the traditional reorganization, creditor 
control is the dominant theme. Indeed, if the experience of large businesses leaving Chapter 11 in 2002 
is any guide, those at the helm do the bidding of the creditors throughout the case.‖); see also supra 
note 31 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT‘S DOMINION 
(2001) (discussing dynamics in U.S. corporate restructurings). 
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capital structure in a timely manner, which would permit contracting to 
mitigate or account for potential change of control events.
227
 The proposed 
disclosures thus actually complement objectives that parties may seek 
through private contracting. 
E. Potential Value to Proposed Disclosures 
The proposed disclosures strike an appropriate balance between the 
proprietary interests of debtholders on the one hand and the management 
and investment interests of the company and its other stakeholders on the 
other.
228
 Under the existing scheme, debtholders are permitted to purchase 
potential future control of the company without providing any information 
regarding their existence or intentions to those affected most by any 
control contest.
229
 Moreover, this lack of disclosure significantly undercuts 
the potential value of takeover activity by limiting any signaling effect and 
intensifying information asymmetry in these transactions. Informing 
management and other stakeholders of the presence of a potentially 
controlling debtholder prevents a fait accompli and gives those parties an 
opportunity to preserve and potentially enhance value.
230
 
That opportunity is particularly meaningful with respect to distressed 
companies.
231
 As explained above, the identification of the fulcrum 
security turns on the valuation of the company—a valuation that may vary 
depending on assumptions, methodology, and future business models.
232
 
Consequently, a debtholder vying for control of a company has the ability 
to depress value through its valuations (or chill the bidding process in the 
sale context), thereby extinguishing the rights of not only shareholders, but 
 
 
 227. Admittedly, the company‘s management may be prevented by cognitive biases—such as 
overconfidence or framing biases—from taking appropriate action, even with relevant and timely 
information. Accordingly, the proposed disclosures are specifically designed to alert other stakeholders 
to the information so that they may discuss the matters with management or take other appropriate 
action. In this respect, the re-emergence of proxy activity by shareholders could facilitate important, 
protective uses of information provided by the proposed disclosures. 
 228. See supra Part IV.A; see also 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 1.2[3], at 27 (4th ed. 2002) (―The focus on disclosure was based on the conclusion that sunlight is 
the best disinfectant.‖). 
 229. See supra Parts I, III. 
 230. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 
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also any junior creditors in the company‘s capital structure.233 Providing 
some information to the company and its stakeholders earlier in the 
process may allow operational or managerial changes that preclude a 
depressed valuation or encourage other stakeholders to engage in any 
control or auction contests. The proposed regulation creates a more level 
playing field that potentially benefits and protects more parties, except for 
those who would rather play without any rules. 
CONCLUSION 
A distressed company‘s debt offers a unique takeover opportunity for 
investors, particularly when contrasted with the more public face of 
equity-based takeovers. An investor purchasing distressed debt can amass 
a substantial portion—either a controlling or blocking share—of the debt 
constituting the company‘s fulcrum security and potentially turn that debt 
into ownership and control of the company itself. Still, just as in the 
equity-based takeover context, debt-based takeovers may enhance 
enterprise value by, for example, disciplining management or providing 
much-needed liquidity to implement a company's restructuring plan. Debt-
based takeovers also, however, expose an already vulnerable company and 
its other stakeholders to value-raiding. Let‘s not indulge some investors in 
what F. Ross James observed in the movie Barbarians at the Gate: ―[They 
seek] to earn money the old-fashioned way. They steal it.‖234 
 
 
 233. See supra Part III.B. 
 234. BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (Ray Stark 1993). 
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